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Conflicts & Capital Allocation
BENJAMIN

P. EDWARDS*

The regulatory structurefor financial advice now tolerates incentives
motivating financial advisors to manipulate and deceive retail
investors. While scholars thus far have arguedfor ways to improve
investor protections, the literature has largely ignored how these

flawed incentives affect the economy.
This Article contends that these flawed incentives cause financial
advisors to negatively affect capital allocation throughout the overall
economy.
This Article draws on literature about manipulation and deception in

principal-agentrelationships to show how conflicts of interest cause
the market for financial advisor services to generate excessive

intermediation, driving harms to the real economy. This Article uses
case studies of non-tradedreal estate investment trusts and closed-end
funds to illustrate howfinancial advisor conflicts of interest contribute

to inefficient capital allocation and inefficiency in the market for
institutionalintermediation.

To address this issue, this Article argues that an effective policy
response will address compensation incentives andfocus on limiting
the ability of conflicts of interest to skew capital allocation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2015, JPMorgan Chase paid $307 million to the U.S.
government because it failed to inform its clients about its conflicts of
interest. 1 In particular, JPMorgan did not tell clients that it was investing client
assets in JPMorgan's proprietary, higher-fee funds. 2 These higher-fee funds
would generate more revenue for JPMorgan, but cause clients to earn
significantly lower returns. 3

I Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, J.P. Morgan to Pay $267 Million for
Disclosure Failures (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-283.html
[https://perma.cc/6KDL-UEPX] (describing related settlements totaling $307 million).
2
3

Id

See OFFICE OF INV'R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & ExcH. CoMM'N, PUB. No.
164, INVESTOR BULLETIN: How FEES AND EXPENSES AFFECT YOUR INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO
(Feb.
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib fees expenses.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AA2K-MXBS] (explaining the significant impact of fees over time on
returns).
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JPMorgan's actions are hardly unique. 4 Undoubtedly, many financial
advisors direct clients to invest in higher-fee funds that generate greater
revenues for the advisors. 5 This regularly occurs even though client interests
6
are almost always better served through simpler, lower-fee funds. While
others have argued that advisor conflicts of interest hurt savings outcomes for
ordinary investors, 7 this Article argues that these conflicts of interest also
cause systemic capital misallocation.8
Commission compensation structures may lead even well-meaning
9
financial advisors to recommend unwise investments to their clients. The
4 One former employee alleged that at Goldman Sachs, "people push the envelope
and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they are not the simplest
investments or the ones most directly aligned with the client's goals[.]" Greg Smith, Why I
Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/0
3/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-sachs.html [https://perma.cc/HJ4Y-LZG8]. Other
banks have faced fines for similar behavior. WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE

FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE Now 86-87 (2016) (explaining that Edward Jones, Morgan
Stanley, Ameriprise, and Citigroup have faced similar fines).
5 See generally Susan E.K. Christoffersen et al., What Do Consumers' Fund Flows
Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers' Incentives, 68 J. FIN. 201 (2013) (documenting
that broker recommendations increase broker profits).
6See Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of
Excessive Fees and "DominatedFunds" in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1488 (2015)
("The issue of fees is important because a substantial body of academic and industry
research suggests that high-cost funds are poor investment options.").
7 For decades, financial services firms have advertised their services and stressed that
consumers should come to them for advice. See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and
CreatingExpectations: Why Brokers Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 756
(2012) (documenting that brokerage firms have long advertised that they provide
personalized advice); Joseph C. Peiffer & Christine Lazaro, Major Investor Losses Due to
Conflicted Advice: Brokerage Industry Advertising Creates the Illusion of a Fiduciary

Duty: Misleading Ads Fuel Confusion, Underscore Need for Fiduciary Standard, 22
PIABA B.J. 1, 1 (2015) (contrasting advertisements purporting to put client interests first
with arbitration defenses from the same institutions arguing that they do not owe a duty to
put client interests before their own). Most Americans operate under the mistaken belief
that all financial advisors have some legal duty to provide advice in the best interests of
their clients. While some financial advisors may have such a duty, many do not. U.S. SEC.
& ExcH. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS i (2011)

[hereinafter FIDUCIARY STUDY], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZRE7-PA3Q].
8 The ultimate goal for financial regulation must be to improve capital allocation. See
Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial
Regulation: Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a DeregulatedSystem, 72 MD. L.

Regulation of Investment Advice:

A

Call for Harmonization, 4

MICH.

Bus.

&

REV. 1173, 1176 (2013) ("[T]he principal social value of financial markets is not to assure
the lowest transaction costs for market participants. Rather, it is to facilitate the efficient
deployment of funds held by investors to productive uses.").
9 To be sure, some financial advisors do owe fiduciary duties to give advice in the
best interests of their clients. For discussions of the divergent standards governing financial
advisors, see generally Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented
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average investor, like someone trying to save for retirement, has many choices
in how to invest her money. Many such investors turn to financial advisors for
guidance, and those advisors are often compensated through sales
commissions. 10 Some products offer the advisors larger commissions, and
advisors have an incentive to steer clients toward products that maximize
advisor commissions. I This incentive structure causes significant losses for
ordinary savers-an estimated $17 billion per year.12
This Article argues that these incentive structures do not merely hurt
individual investors and reward advisors, but in fact, drive the creation of
needlessly complex financial products and retard economic growth. 13 These
structures also increase systemic risk and magnify the likelihood of future
financial crashes. 14
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47 (2014), and Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and
Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make a Material Difference?, 14 J.
BuS. & SEC. L. 105 (2014).
10
1Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. Prr. L. REV. 439, 445
(2010).
11See id. at 448-49 (suggesting that one solution to the problem might be to limit
"differential commissions that cannot be justified in terms of the effort necessary to sell the
product knowledgeably and responsibly, for example").
12 In the aggregate, conflicted financial advice causes ordinary retail investors, i.e.
individual, household, or noninstitutional investors, to transfer significant sums from their
savings to their financial advisors. In February of 2015, the White House Council of
Economic Advisers released a report on conflicted investment advice, conservatively
estimating that "the aggregate annual cost of conflicted advice is about $17 billion each
year" for retirement savers. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED
INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (Feb. 2015). In practical terms, retirees
receiving conflicted advice will run out of savings more than five years earlier than if they
had received unbiased advice. Id. at 3. When these retirees deplete their savings, they may
consume more public resources or depend on support from their families, reducing the next
generation's ability to save and invest for the future. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation
as a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the
Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 686 (2015) (describing how current
shareholders can have intergenerational impacts).
13
See, e.g., Siong Hook Law & Nirvikar Singh, Does Too Much Finance Harm
Economic Growth?, 41 J. BANKING & FIN. 36, 36 (2014); Jean-Louis Arcand et al., Too
Much Finance? 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/161, 2012),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wpl2161.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSL2-5VLP];
Stephen G. Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessingthe Impact of Finance on Growth 1
(Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 381, 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/work3
81.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3G9-U5YM]; cf Kathryn Judge, IntermediaryInfluence, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 573, 575 (2015) ("[R]ecent studies suggest that the relationship between the
size of a country's financial sector and the rate of its development is an inverted 'U'having a robust financial system is critical for economic growth, but too much finance
impedes development.").
1 4 See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation,
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 725 (2012) ("[C]omplexity arising
from the spread of financial innovations may contribute to systemic risk . . . ."); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198-99 (2008) ("[F]inancial institutions ... are
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This Article argues that prohibiting commission-based compensation for
financial advisors will substantially reduce these problems.1 5 Eliminating this
corrosive conflict of interest will improve the flow of capital, reduce systemic
risk, and reshape financial services culture in a way that protects ordinary
investors.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses how financial advisor
conflicts of interest negatively affect the capital markets and destabilize the
financial system as a whole. Part III argues that banning commission
compensation for financial advisors will improve capital allocation and market
functioning. Part IV considers alternative solutions and the implications of
regulating commission compensation structures.
II. THE CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE PROBLEM
The capital markets exist for two purposes: (i) to allocate capital to the
most profitable opportunities (on the macroeconomic level); and (ii) to help
16
market participants invest or borrow money (on the microeconomic level).
Much has been said about the second purpose and how conflicts of interest
between financial advisors and retail investors frustrate individual attempts to
save for the future.17 Yet these conflicts of interest also affect the broader
economy by distorting the ways in which capital flows to fund business
opportunities.
The capital markets drive economic growth by moving capital from savers
to opportunities in need of capital.' 8 The capital markets' ability to allocate

&

important sources of capital. Therefore, their failure, especially in large numbers, can
deprive society of capital and increase its cost. Increases in the cost of capital, or decreases
in its availability, are the most serious direct consequences of a systemic failure.").
15
While the proposal might appear radical in the United States, other nations have
already taken this approach; commission-driven investment advice for retail investors has
been banned in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Netherlands. JEREMY BURKE
ANGELA A. HUNG, FINANCIAL ADVICE MARKETS: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 8, 12,

20-21 (2015), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchreports/RR1200/RR12
69/RAND RR1269.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6AC-XP3E].
16
Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35
(2010) ("The basic goals of the markets have remained the same - namely, the efficient
allocation, transfer, and deployment of capital resources and risk-bearing."); see also Stout,
supra note 12, at 686 (explaining that capital markets "can transform wealth that will be
generated in the future into wealth that can be enjoyed today in the form of a higher share
price").
17
See generally Tamar Frankel, The Regulation of Brokers, Dealers, Advisers and
FinancialPlanners, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 123 (2010); Thomas Lee Hazen, Are
Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and FiduciaryDuties, 2010
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 710; Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn't My Broker Always Looking Out
for My Best Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 41 (2009).
18

See JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE REAL BUSINESS OF FINANCE 135

(2015) ("A central function of financial markets is to direct money from savers to
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capital to fund the development of more real assets depends on how well
financial assets are priced to faithfully reflect the value of the real assets
behind their returns. 19 For example, if two firms both seek capital to open a
restaurant or build a plant, the opportunity that will "generate more profits per
invested dollar is the more desirable real investment and should attract funds
first." 20 If the market prices for these new financial assets reflect the

underlying merits and risks of the opportunity, the better opportunity will offer
better returns. 2 1 If financial assets are not priced accurately, the capital
markets will not allocate capital as efficiently. 22 There is an inexorable link
between capital allocation and the health of the macroeconomy. 23 As
explained below, conflicted investment advice drives capital misallocation,
causing significant macroeconomic and other harms.
A variety of financial intermediaries play significant roles in moving
capital through the economy. 24 Institutional intermediaries, such as pensions
and mutual funds, manage pools of assets for their investors. Banks, brokerdealer firms, insurance companies, and others may innovate and create new

businesses, home-owners and governments. They in turn use these savings to build, own
and operate houses, shops, offices, warehouses and factories . . . .").

19
See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 769 (1985) (explaining that
in a fundamentally or allocatively efficient market, the financial returns for a particular
investment
opportunity will correspond to the discounted present value of its shares).
20
Id
21
The capital markets function well when capital flows to its best use and funds these
opportunities. See Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail Flight, 20
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 36, 45 (2014) ("Allocative efficiency requires capital to be directed
to its highest and best use."); Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of
Public Companies' Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 121, 137 ("[W]hen stock
prices are accurate, firms with superior prospects-that is, those with higher values-will
generally draw more capital and firms with inferior ones-that is, those with smaller
expected future cash flows-will draw less.").
22
See James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategiesfor a 75Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REv. 941, 956 (2009) ("[UInaccurate securities prices impair the
allocational efficiency of capital markets, a central objective of securities regulation.");
Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate"Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977, 1005 (1992) ("Inaccurate stock prices can result in an inefficient allocation
of capital.").
23
Binyamin Appelbaum, This Time, Cheaper Oil Does Little for the U.S. Economy,
N.Y. TMsES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/business/energyenvironment/this-time-cheaper-oil-does-little-for-the-us-economy.html [https://perma.cc/U
U84-834X] ("There's a feedback between financial markets and the economy..... [Even if]
markets are irrational . .. that spills over into the real economy." (quoting Andrew T.
Levin, former adviser to Federal Reserve Chair Janet L. Yellen)).
24 For a definition of financial intermediaries, see Kristin N. Johnson, Governing
Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REv. 185, 187 n.2 (2013), who
defines "financial intermediaries" as "privately owned and controlled businesses that
provide fundamental financial services to financial market participants."
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financial products. Many investors now rely on different financial advisors for
25
assistance navigating this constantly evolving landscape.
Of course, these financial advisors have their own interests to pursue as
well. Collectively, conflicts of interest at the retail level have macroeconomic
26
Recent
impacts because of the size of the capital pool being allocated.
information indicates that as of 2013, U.S. households controlled equity
securities valued at over $13.3 trillion. 27 For the most part, retail investors now
channel these assets through institutional intermediaries. 2 8 This Article focuses
on how and why retail investor funds flow to particular intermediaries and
what this means for the market for institutional intermediation, business
culture, and the economy as a whole.

A. Assessing the Quality ofFinancialAdvice
In some respects, financial advice may resemble wine ratings for two.
reasons: (i) opinions about quality vary wildly; and (ii) higher-cost does not
yield higher quality. 29 With respect to the first, no uniform standard exists to
set the scope for personalized financial advice. Some investors may prefer a
financial advisor that assists only with asset allocation. Others may prefer
more assistance with other financial decisions, such as whether to buy a home
and how and when to claim their Social Security benefits. In some instances, a
preference for a higher level of customer service may justify the decision to
pay a financial advisor more for assistance.
While it may be difficult to identify the best advice in any particular
situation, basic care and loyalty standards seem likely to generate higher
quality advice. Investors may receive higher quality advice when their
financial advisor exercises reasonable care to understand the customer's
25 For a detailed discussion of the different types of financial advisors now serving the
retail market, see infra Part III.B.
26 The retail capital allocation problem will continue to expand because shifting
economic relationships have also fundamentally restructured the retail investment. For a
thorough discussion of this change and its implications, see JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT
RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT
You CAN FIGHT BACK (2006).
AND How
27
SIFMA, 2016 FACT BOOK 80 (2016).
28
See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization

of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1026 (2009) ("The last thirty years or so
have brought a rapid shift toward institutionalization."); Anne M. Tucker, The Outside
Investor: Citizen Shareholders & CorporateAlienation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 99, 105-06
(2013) ("With self-directed defined-contribution plans, participants began to rely heavily
on mutual and index funds as investment options, thus increasing the number of indirect
investors and the significance of institutional investors." (footnote omitted)).
29
See Further Evidence that Wine Tasting Is Wildly Subjective, FREAKONOMICS (July
8, 2013), http://freakonomics.com/2013/07/08/further-evidence-that-wine-tasting-is-wildly
-subjective/ [https://perma.cc/7KMF-V2PW] ("A few years ago, we did a podcast on
whether expensive wine tastes better. There is now further evidence that the answer to that
question is no-even for elite wine critics.").
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situation and confirm that the advice given about particular products or
strategies is not based on inaccurate or incomplete information. 30 Good advice
will also be loyal advice-given in the customer's best interests as opposed to
the best interests of the financial advisor.
B. Puzzling ProductPurchases
At present, a significant volume of investment advice is not given in
investors' best interests. This may be inferred because far too many investors
make decisions that appear irreconcilable with wealth-maximization motives.
Consider puzzling investor decisions to purchase Non-traded or Non-listed
Real Estate Investment Trusts (Non-Traded REITs) and the initial public
offering (IPO) of closed-end funds. As explained below, frequent purchases of
these products seem unlikely absent a commission-based incentive to steer
clients into these products. While this Article profiles two frequently
exploitative offerings, there are many other financial products that either
should not be sold or should be sold much less often. 3 1
1. Non-Traded Real Estate Investment Trusts
Non-traded REITs appear cynically designed to make it possible for
financial intermediaries to advance their own interests at the expense of their
clients in the primary market. Curiously, while non-traded REITs have long
been a concern for consumer advocates, they are little discussed in the legal
literature. 32 Despite this, financial advisors have channeled billions of dollars
of retail investor capital into non-traded REIT offerings. 33
30
31

See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 120-21.
See, e.g., JOSHUA M. BROWN, BACKSTAGE

WALL STREET

209-22

(2012)

(describing a range of financial products as "murder holes"); Ann Lipton, I Do Not Think It
Means What You Think It Means, Bus. L. PROF BLOG (May 7, 2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2016/05/you-keep-using-that-word-i-do-no
t-think-it-means-what-you-think-it-means.html
[https://perma.cc/HNM2-MG28]
("The
story begins with variable annuities, a product that might be suitable if you're trying to
shelter your assets from a lawsuit, but otherwise one whose chief virtue lies in its capacity
to serve as a litmus test for the honesty of your broker.").
32
See BROWN, supra note 31, at 219 ("[T]here are huge questions surrounding the
selling of private real estate investment trusts . . . ."); Barbara Black, Curbing BrokerDealers'Abusive Sales Practices:Does ProfessorJensen's Integrity Framework Offer a
Better Approach?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 771, 778 (2013) ("FINRA and State
Attorneys General have brought enforcement actions against broker-dealers for abusive
practices in the sale of non-traded REITs to unsophisticated investors.").
33
See Micah Hauptman, Why Investors Should Think Twice About Nontraded REITs,
WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/13/why-investors("Investors
[https://perma.cc/M3AY-HEFA]
should-think-twice-about-nontraded-reits/
purchased at least $116 billion in nontraded REITs over the last 25 years and are at least
$45 billion worse off than they would have been if they had merely invested in a
diversified portfolio of traded REITs .... ).
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Non-traded REITs are a subset of REITs. REITs are quasi-corporate
entities that provide a tax-advantaged vehicle for investors to invest in real
estate.3 4 A REIT takes a pool of investor capital and uses that money to buy
income-producing properties. 35 Typical REIT holdings include apartment
buildings, commercial properties, or even timber-producing land. 36 Often,
investors will purchase REITs to access the steady income from tenants' rent
payments. 37
There are a variety of REITs available for retail investors seeking income
or to diversify their portfolio by holding real estate. 3 8 Both traded and nontraded REITs are registered with the SEC and provide the public with annual
and quarterly reports. 39 Both invest in real estate and receive preferential tax
treatment for paying dividends. 4 0 There are other differences-particularly in
the fees charged. Non-traded REITs generally come with initial offering fees
and expenses between 12% to 15% of the offering, which is quite high. 4 1
Given the fee level, financial advisors receive extraordinarily high
42
compensation for selling these non-traded REIT shares to retail investors.
One recent study found that these non-traded REITs average upfront fees
amounting to 13.2% of invested capital. 43 This means that, on average, an
investor seeking to put $100,000 to work in the capital markets will actually
only put in about $86,800, losing $13,200 to commissions and fees. In
contrast, an investor seeking real estate exposure could also buy $100,000
worth of traded-REIT shares for a trading commission of $10 or less.

34

See Public Non-Traded REITs-Perform a Careful Review Before Investing,

FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/reits/pl24232 [https://
perma.cc/LWL7-7TJS] (last updated Nov. 30, 2016).
35

See id
SIMoN LACK, WALL STREET POTHOLES 3 (2016).
37
1d
36

38

See Office of lnv'r Educ. & Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Non-Traded REITs, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alertsbulletins/ibnontradedreits.html [https://perma.cc/4WMA-CW84].
39
1d
40
d
41 Robbie Whelan, Nontraded RE1Ts Are Hot, but Have Plenty of Critics: As
Investors Pour Money into Funds, Skeptics See Better Alternatives, WALL STREET J. (June

15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nontraded-reits-offer-high-returns-but-critics-citefees-and-illiquidity-1402670753 [https://perma.cc/V9DV-58EW]. Writing about a high-fee
REIT in 2005, David F. Swensen, the chief investment officer of Yale University, argued
that the "most generous characterizations of [these] fees range from obscene to
despicable." DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL
APPROACH TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT 71 (2005).

SUCCESS:

A

FUNDAMENTAL

42 See Office of Inv'r Educ. & Advocacy, supra note 38.
43 Brian Henderson et al., An Empirical Analysis of Non-TradedREITs, 19 J. WEALTH
MGMT. 83-84 (2016).
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Non-traded REITs allow financial advisors to exploit a sophistication gap
between themselves and their clients.44 Retail investors struggle to understand
the actual fees and expenses involved with non-traded REITs because they do
not pay the commissions directly, rendering the true cost opaque until and
unless the investor reads and understands the fine print.4 5 Indeed, it seems
unlikely that many fully informed persons would opt to purchase shares in a
non-traded REIT if they understood the fee structure and other options
available. One critic of non-traded REIT sales encapsulated what an honest
discussion of the typical non-traded REIT fees would sound like, with the
representative saying:
If you invest $100,000 I will be paid a commission of $7,000. My firm is
going to get $1,500 - $2,000 in revenue share. My wholesaler, the salesman
that works for the investment's sponsor company, will get $1,000. He is a
great guy, buys me dinner all of the time and takes me golfing. The sponsor
company is going to get around $3,000 to pay for some of the costs they
incurred in setting up the investment. So all in on Day 1 there will be around
46
$87,000 left over to actually invest. I bet you are getting excited.

Financial advisors may not have paid appropriate reputational costs for
selling non-traded REITs with outsize fees and expenses because the illiquid
products have, for some time, appeared on retail investor brokerage statements
at the price retail investors paid for them. 47 Investors purchasing these nontraded REITs for $10 per share saw post-purchase statements listing a price
per share of $10-notwithstanding that a significant percentage of the
investment had already been diverted to fees and expenses. 4 8 When the price
per share updates to a more accurate figure after a long expanse of time, a
financial advisor may deflect responsibility by pointing to uncertainty within

44To be sure, many financial advisors may not personally understand the superior
alternatives. Their broker-dealer firm may have only trained them to sell non-traded REITs.
45
BROwN, supra note 31, at 219 ("[O]f course that 7 percent commission is built into
the offering price; the client never sees it or feels it (and in many cases doesn't even know
about it).").
46 Joshua M. Brown, Scenes from an Independent Brokerage Firm, REFORMED

BROKER (May 21, 2014), http://therefornedbroker.com/2014/05/21 /scenes-from-an-indepe
ndent-brokerage-firm/ [https://perma.cc/FW7V-FY2Z] (describing non-traded REITs as
"just absolute murderholes for clients - they pay the brokers so much that they cannot
possibly work out").
47 Order Approving FINRA Proposed Rule Change Relating to Per Share Estimated
Valuations for Unlisted DPP and REIT Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-73339, 79
Fed. Reg. 62489 (Oct. 10, 2014).
48
See id. at 62491 (approving a valuation rule change to alter the "practice of
displaying a DPP or REIT security's immutable offering price as its per share estimated
value on customer account statements throughout the offering period (which can last
several years)").
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the broader financial markets. 4 9 Or, the product may show gains above the
purchase price, effectively camouflaging the portion raked off by
intermediaries. While a recent rule change requiring the disclosure of a more
accurate per-share value post-sale may provide more transparency, the impact
of the alteration remains to be seen. 50
Still, early reports indicate that some financial advisors intend to sell less
of these products now that clients may be more likely to appreciate the fees.
For example, one financial advisor with Cetera Financial Group recently said
that he would no longer sell the products because he did not "want to have any
clients ever saying, 'Oh, yeah, by the way, how come this is $88,000 instead
of $100,000?'"51 While the financial advisor claimed to have previously
discussed fees and expenses with his clients, the decision to stop selling the
products under a modified disclosure regime supports the inference that the
products were sold because clients did not appreciate the costs. 52 In contrast
purchasers of publicly traded REITs immediately know the market value of
their shares from the public market price.
Capital misallocation may also be observed because non-traded REITs
tend to underperform publicly traded REITs. 53 One analysis found that "had
non-traded REIT investors instead invested in a low-cost and liquid REIT
mutual fund, they would have accumulated $44 billion more than they
accumulated in the non-traded REITs. Non-traded REITs' average annual
returns are 4.0%, compared to 11.3% in a traded REIT portfolio." 54 The
49 Given a long enough expanse of time, the updated per share value may even show
an increase over the initial sale price if the underlying assets have appreciated in value.
While a retail investor may see a positive return in absolute terms, the product will almost
certainly have significantly underperformed a publicly traded REIT.
50
Under soon-to-be-enforced rules, broker-dealer firms will have to provide updated
per share valuations to their clients. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY

NOTICE 15-02: DPP AND UNLISTED REIT SECURITIES (Jan. 2015), https://www.finra.org/sit
es/default/files/notice doc file ref/Notice Regulatory_15-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y74RAW9U] (explaining the new valuation methods to go into effect in April of 2016); see also
LACK, supra note 36, at 8 (explaining that the lack of a public trading market for nontraded REITs inhibits investors from discovering the actual value of their shares-and by
extension the REIT); Chuck Jaffe, Non-Traded REIT Is a Non-Starter, MARKETWATCH
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/non-traded-reit-is-a-non-starter-201111-04 [https://perma.cc/Y554-JCRR] (explaining that investors should not rely on the
stated share value because "management won't even calculate net asset value until 18
months after the completion of the offering, and that the current share value is 'arbitrary"').
51 Ann Marsh, Commissions Exposed, Adviser Stops Selling Nontraded REITs, FIN.
PLAN. (June 8, 2016) (quoting Colin Mackenzie, financial advisor, Cetera Financial
Group), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/commissions-exposed-adviser-stops-selli
ng-nontraded-reits [https://perma.cc/DSW4-9RVQ].
52
See id (quoting Knut Rostad of the Institute for the Fiduciary Standard as
remarking that the financial advisor "only made these sales because he could hide what he
charged for them").
53
See Henderson et al., supra note 43, at 84.
54

See id
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underperformance of non-traded REITs appears even more puzzling because
illiquid assets should return a premium over liquid assets.5 5
This underperformance
indicates likely fundamental, allocative
inefficiency in the capital markets. Some of this allocative inefficiency may be
attributable to the deceptive and manipulative marketing strategies employed
by the issuers and financial advisors-raising a question as to whether the nontraded REIT sector attracts capital on its merit or its ability to bias
intermediaries by paying above average fees. To the extent that it attracts
capital by biasing intermediaries, other issuers suffer from increased capital
costs and attract less investor capital than would be expected on the merits of
their offerings.
This inefficiency affects the real economy. When non-traded REITs use
conflicted financial advice to gather an outsized amount of capital, it causes
excessive capital to flow to the real estate market-driving up the prices of
real assets. 56 If the equilibrium were different-rewarding more competition
on the merits and the risks instead of efforts to bias financial advisors, these
products would likely attract less capital, freeing it for more productive uses.

2. Closed-EndFunds
Capital misallocation on account of financial advisors manipulating and
deceiving retail investors may also be observed with the sale of closed-end
funds (CEFs) to retail investors.5 7 Few investment options seem less attractive
than buying the shares of a closed-end fund in an IPO, particularly if similar
CEFs already exist.58 Indeed, the continuing existence of CEFs has puzzled
economists for decades. 59 Because the IPO shares are sold at a premium and
will soon trade at a significant discount, economists cannot discern any good
reason why a rational investor would purchase CEF shares in an IPO instead

55

See Yair Listokin, Taxation and Liquidity, 120 YALE L.J. 1682, 1689 (2011) ("A
considerable body of both theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrates that the
liquidity of an asset is an important determinant of its return, with more liquidity being
associated with a lower return.").
56
See SWENSEN, supra note 41, at 75 ("No rational buyer can compete with the
[REITs'] willingness to overpay for product.... [I]nvestors suffer the double indignity of
high fees and poor investment prospects.").
57 For an argument that CEF IPOs do not appear to be in the best interests of
customers, see Benjamin P. Edwards, Closed-End Fund IPO Considerations, 22 PIABA
B.J. 283, 283 (2015), who notes that "absent a compelling reason, investors should
generally avoid purchasing CEF shares in an initial public offering (IPO)."
58
See BROWN, supra note 31, at 221 ("These funds should only be bought at a
discount in the secondary market. Within 90 days of the IPO, the 'penalty bid' phase ends
and brokers can freely dump shares while keeping their commissions-you will be down
15 percent in a blink.").
59
See Charles M.C. Lee et al., Anomalies: Closed-End Mutual Funds, 4 J. ECON.
PERSP. 153, 154 (1990).
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of purchasing the shares of a CEF already on the market. 60 If no rational
investor would buy CEF shares during an IPO, then CEFs should eventually
cease to exist in a rational expectation equilibrium because new CEFs would
not be created. 6 1 Yet CEF IPOs persist, and stockbrokers continue to sell CEF
shares to retail investors, despite a long record of underperformance. 62 Their
continued existence is best interpreted as revealing capital misallocation
caused by commission compensation structures.
Importantly, not all capital markets participants can be taken by CEF
IPOs.63 Recent empirical information regarding CEF holders confirms the
impression that sophisticated investors do not purchase CEF shares in IPOs.64
The evidence indicates that "institutional ownership in recent CEF IPOs is
extremely low compared to operating company IPOs." 65 This means that,
when more sophisticated institutional money managers evaluate investment
6
opportunities, they generally pass on CEF IPOs. 6
Many explanations for CEF IPO sales point to purchasers' lack ofsophistication. Economists and other experts studying the products have
theorized that the CEF IPO shares are bought by "noise traders, or 'suckers,'
who are sufficiently optimistic to buy overpriced assets." 67 Some assert that
60

See id ("So, puzzle one: Why does anyone buy these funds when they are first
issued?"); Charles M.C. Lee et al., Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46
J. FIN. 75, 75 (1991) ("Few problems in finance are as perplexing as the closed-end fund
puzzle.").
61 See Kathleen Weiss Hanley et al., The Marketing of Closed-End Fund IPOs:,.
Evidence from Transactions Data, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 127, 128 (1996) ("[I1n a
rational expectations equilibrium, these [CEFs] should not get started at all.").
62
One recent study revealed that when compared against CEF shares already on the
market (seasoned shares), shares purchased during a CEF IPO underperformed seasoned
shares by 8.52% after six months and 11.05% after one year. Diana Shao, Closed-End
Fund
IPOs:
Sold
Not
Bought
1-3
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2652432 [https://perma.cc/24T3-XHG7] (last revised Mar. 17,
2016).
63 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 725 (2003) ("[I]nstitutions
hold only a very small percentage of closed-end mutual fund shares, leaving individual
investors as the central clientele for this type of investment.").
6See Shao, supra note 62, at 18.
65
Id at 3.
66
If an institutional money manager purchased and held CEF IPO shares, they would
significantly underperform and likely attract less capital than their competitors. See Ronald
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 863, 893 (2013) ("Forprofit institutions like mutual funds have learned that investors follow relative performance
and direct assets accordingly."); see also LACK, supra note 36, at 27 ("It's generally the
dumb money that buys a CEF IPO at [issue price].").
67
Lee et al., supra note 59, at 162 (noting that "[i]t helps to have a gimmick," such as
a famous asset manager). In the economics literature the term "noise trader" is frequently
used as a euphemism for idiot. Lawrence Summers famously "began a paper on finance by
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"[i]nvestors who wish to hold closed-end funds should never buy them at the
IPO and the suggestion that they should by financial advisors is suspect." 68
One anecdotal account from a financial advisor indicates that the
intermediaries serving the retail market understand that purchasing CEF IPO
shares is unwise:
I once had a conversation with a Wall Street analyst at a very big firm
about an upcoming CEF IPO. She had briefly forgotten about my background
in finance and must have been thinking of me as another one of the patsies
who willingly part with 6% of their investment for no good reason. She was
attempting to get me interested in becoming a Day One investor, and I
pointed out that many investors know to avoid CEF IPOs and wait for the
secondary market price to buy 6% cheaper. Quickly recognizing her mistake,
she breezily acknowledged the correctness of my view! Even though her job
was to write research that would help persuade investors to overpay for the
securities, she understood the fallacy in the message she was pushing. 69

C. Harms Causedby Conflicted FinancialAdvice
The harms from conflicted financial advice extend far beyond the harms to
individual investors. While these investors suffer subpar returns, the
misallocation of social resources caused by conflicted investment advice
causes widespread harm.

1. MisdirectedFinancialInnovation andAmplified Systemic Risks
The 2008 financial crisis clearly demonstrated that financial innovation
has a dark side and that financial complexity may be used to exploit
investors. 70 In some instances, intermediaries
can exploit the investors mistakes by creating financial instruments that pay
off in the states that investors overweight and pay off less highly in the states
declaring: 'THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around."' Paul Krugman, How Did Economists
Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magaz
ine/06Economic-t.html [https://perma.cc/L9ND-Y3EH] (explaining that "the preferred
term in the academic literature" for idiots is "noise traders").
68
See Edward S. O'Neal, Closed-End Fund IPOs (June 29, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/Closed%20End%2OFund%20lPOs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8G3-BVLE].
69
See LACK, supra note 36, at 27.
70
See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEx. L. REv. 1601, 1647 (2012) ("There certainly is
empirical evidence to suggest that financial product complexity can be used to exploit
investors."); Frank Partnoy, HistoricalPerspectiveson the FinancialCrisis:Ivar Kreuger,
the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of

Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431, 431-32 (2009) (explaining that "financial innovation
often has a dark side" that can be driven by "disclosure gaps and misunderstandings").
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that investors underweight, leading the investors to value the new instruments
more highly than they would if they understood financial markets and
71
correctly evaluated information about probabilities of future events.
For example, the structured equity products Morgan Stanley markets to retail
investors provide such abnormal negative returns that their purchase cannot be
explained by any "benign reasons" and "most ... investors would likely have
been better off investing in non-interest bearing accounts." 72 Rather, their
creation best indicates that sophisticated financial intermediaries profit by
exploiting their counterparties' relative lack of sophistication.
Financial innovation designed to allow financial intermediaries to exploit
conflicts of interest poses a particular danger to the financial system. 73 For
example, innovations that simply increase capital intermediation within the
financial sector-such as Morgan Stanley's structured equity products-may
provide no significant social benefit and only amplify systemic risk. 74
Needless, complexity-increasing financial innovation contributes to systemic
risk and fragility by increasing the length of intermediation chains. 75 For
example, a financial advisor might earn a rich incentive payment for
transferring client assets to a fund of funds-an institutional intermediary that
invests assets with other institutional intermediaries. 76 Systemic risk increases
with each additional intermediary added because every new intermediation
77
node creates another opportunity for fragmentation.
This is not to say that financial innovation does not ever unlock benefits
benefiting all parties. Frequently, it allows market participants to price and
allocate risks in new, socially useful ways. 78 Often, this process shifts risks to
parties better able to bear them and allows new forms of diversification. As an
example of a worthwhile financial innovation, consider the problem faced by

71 Brian J. Henderson & Neil D. Pearson, The Dark Side of FinancialInnovation: A
Case Study of the Pricing of a Retail FinancialProduct, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 227, 228 (2011)
(concluding that retail investors pay, on average, an 8% premium over fair market value for
certain complex financial products).
72
Id at 246.
73
See Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophyfor FinancialStability Regulation, 45 LOY.
U. CI. L.J. 173, 218-20 (2013) (explaining how complexity that merely moves capital
within the financial sector and not to the development of real assets may threaten financial
stability).
74
1d at 220-21; see also Henderson & Pearson, supra note 71, at 229 (discussing
Morgan Stanley's Structured Equity Products).
75See Judge, supra note 13, at 630 ("The lengthening of intermediation chains
increases systemic risk through multiple mechanisms.").
76
See id at 608.
77
See Judge, supra note 14, at 657 (explaining how increased complexity generates
systemic risk).
78See Cathy Hwang & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Value of Uncertainty, 110 Nw. U.
L. REv. 283, 285-88 (2015) (describing the securitization process used to spread risk).
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the artist David Bowie in 1997.79 He held a portfolio of ownership rights to
royalties from music and film. 80 While these royalties would likely pay Bowie
substantial revenues over time, he wanted access today to the capital that these
assets would generate over the tomorrows to come. 8 1 The capital markets
created a solution, dubbed Bowie Bonds, where David Bowie transferred his
royalty rights to a trustee for a ten-year period of time. 82 The expected revenue
stream from David Bowie's royalties allowed him to sell $55 million worth of
bonds, allowing David Bowie to shift his consumption of the gains from his
music into the present. 83
While David Bowie shifted consumption from the future to the present,
the other party to the deal shifted its consumption from the present to the
future. 84 In buying the Bowie Bonds, the investor on the opposite side of the
deal took funds it did not need today and used the Bowie Bonds to gain more
funds in the future, spending $55 million dollars today for a greater amount
over time. 85 In these instances, financial innovation does good, unlocking
benefits for all parties to a deal.

2. Conflicts of Interest Increase Capital Costs
Pervasive conflicts of interest raise the cost of capital both directly and
indirectly, inhibiting economic growth. 86 Conflicts of interest directly increase
the cost of capital by forcing issuers to compete with each other to bias
intermediaries. Consider the dilemma faced by an issuer, Company A, willing
to offer 4% of the capital raised to intermediaries as compensation for their
services selling the product to investors. If another issuer, Company B, offers
6% of the capital raised as compensation to intermediaries that recommend it,
Company A will need to either find another intermediary or increase the
amount of capital it offers the intermediaries in exchange.8 7
79

See Tommy Stubbington & Mike Bird, David Bowie: The Man Who Sold the
World... and Bonds, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/davidbowie-the-man-who-sold-the-worldand-bonds-1452542807
[https://perma.cc/NZM7PTCM].
8
0 Id
81 Id
82

Id
d.
84
jd
85 Stubbington & Bird, supra note 79.
86 The cost of capital influences economic growth because it determines how existing
businesses and entrepreneurs will access capital to pursue development in the real
economy. See Ralph K. Winter, PayingLawyers, Empowering Prosecutors,and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DuKE L.J. 945, 945 (1993) ("The
lower the cost of capital to a nation's entrepreneurs, the more that will be purchased.").
87
While it is possible that intermediaries could compete with each other on fees and
lower the cost of capital by underbidding each other, the market for financial services does
not appear particularly competitive. See Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REv. 1517,
83
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Conflicts of interest and exploitative practices may also raise the cost of
capital by causing investors to distrust the securities markets.8 8 This may cause
them to discount the amount they are willing to pay for securities to the extent
that they lose faith in the judgment of the intermediary recommending a
particular transaction. 89 Of course, the existence of this discount depends on
investors recognizing that conflicts of interest exist and responding to the
conflict. While not all investors will appreciate or react to conflicts of interest,
a significant enough portion may respond, effectively increasing the cost of
capital.
While this harm may be difficult to measure, distrust of financial
90
institutions can drive significant macroeconomic harms and lead to panics.
In relationships where transaction partners trust each other's integrity, it frees
them "to act quickly and with confidence, again and again." 9 1 When an
investor does not trust a financial advisor, it forces the expenditure of
additional resources to assess the quality of a recommendation, further
increasing the cost of capital.92

3. Inefficient and Excessive InstitutionalIntermediation
Conflicts of interest skew how institutional intermediaries gather investor
capital. Many different institutional intermediaries-mutual funds, definedbenefit pension plans, insurance companies, and others-manage retail
investor capital. 93 Indeed, for most retail investors, all their capital flows to the
market through these institutional intermediaries. 94 In every case, their
1545 (2013) ("[F]inancial intermediaries often operate in industries where there are a
limited number of market participants and high barriers to entry, increasing the likelihood
that they will be able to earn supra-competitive fees on some types of transactions."
(emphasis added)).
88
See Ziven Scott Birdwell, The Key Elements for Developing a Securities Market to
Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmapfor Emerging Markets, 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
535, 545 (2011) ("[A]buses... eat away at capital markets, destroy investor confidence,

and increase the cost of capital.").
89
Cf Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928,
967 (2014) ("If investors come to see the securities markets as a rigged game-one that
seems by design to systematically disadvantage ordinary investors-they could respond by
discounting the amount that they are willing to pay for all securities, thereby raising the
cost of capital.").
90

See ANNA BERNASEK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTEGRITY 8 (2010) ("The result of all

that integrity and trust unraveling was an economic contraction so profound that it affected
every American together with vast populations around the world.").
91 Id at 11 ("Partners in trust are spared a multitude of worries-whether they'll get
paid, whether they'll get what they think they're paying for.").
92

See id

93

See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1026 (discussing the rise of institutional
intermediation).
94

See Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined

Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 177-78 (2013) ("While there are individual
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continued existence as intermediaries depends on their ability to gather a pool
of capital to manage-without assets, you cannot have an asset manager.
Institutional intermediaries compete against each other on a variety of
fronts within the market for institutional intermediation. 9 5 While relative
performance is certainly a factor, they also compete through ordinary
marketing and by providing incentives for financial advisors to recommend
their funds. 96 Successful intermediaries grow larger as they attract more net
capital inflows.
Financial advisor incentives affect which institutional intermediaries
receive capital. 97 Before reaching the traditional securities markets, investor
assets frequently pass through at least two layers of intermediation: (i)
intermediation from a financial advisor selecting an institutional intermediary;
and (ii) the institutional intermediary then investing the assets. 98 Consider, for
example, the recent SEC enforcement proceeding against Everhart Financial
Group, an investment advisory firm, for skewing its recommendations."
Clients came to Everhart for assistance. 10 0 Everhart "nearly always" steered
non-retirement clients into mutual funds that routed fees back to Everhart's
owners.101 These conflicts of interest explain how many institutional
intermediaries collect capital even though investing in their funds or at
particular fee levels appears unwise. 102
differences among many investors (i.e., priority, time horizon, risk tolerance, level of
diversification), citizen shareholders have commonalities in how they enter the market,
their investment in indirect funds, and a rational preference for long-term growth to fund
future retirement." (footnote omitted)).
95The market for institutional intermediation is the market for the services of
institutional intermediaries. Institutions that manage capital compete against each other.
96
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 66, at 893 ("For-profit institutions like mutual
funds have learned that investors follow relative performance and direct assets
accordingly."). For a description of different fees and expenses in the mutual fund space,
see John A. Haslem, The "Many Faces" of Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing, J. INDEX
INVESTING, Winter 2014, at 59, 59-60, and Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
supra note 1.
97
See Christoffersen et al., supra note 5, at 229.
98In some instances, there may be additional layers of intermediation if the
institutional intermediary invests the assets gathered with other intermediaries. One
example of this dynamic would be intermediaries known as funds of funds-an investment
fund that invests in a variety of other investment funds.
"Everhart Fin. Grp., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 76897, 2016 WL 159329, at
*2 (Jan. 14, 2016).
100Id.
101
Id
102

Illustrating the powerful draw of conflicted payments, Everhart collected these fees
even though the Investment Advisers Act required it "to seek the most favorable terms
reasonably available under the circumstances" when executing client transactions. See
Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2713, 2008 WL
598424, at *6 (Mar. 5, 2008) (citing Interpretative Release Concerning the Scope of
Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 3423170, 51 Fed. Reg. 16004 (Apr. 23, 1986)).
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The current market for institutional intermediation is best explained by
financial advisor preferences, not investor preferences. 103 In the idealized
world of economic theory, one populated by perfectly rational, well-informed
and high-functioning persons with the time to critically consider the
differences between institutional intermediaries, the market for institutional
intermediation would look strikingly different.104 Institutional intermediaries
would compete by undercutting their rivals and lowering costs-a form of
competition benefiting investors. Rational investors would select the firms that
offered them the best results. In theory, this seemingly creates a powerful
incentive for some entrepreneur to provide better advice to retail investors for
a reasonable fee. If the upstart providing superior advice secured large profits
from serving the retail market, we would expect others to follow and for
competition to drive prices down still further to an efficient equilibrium point.
A similar dynamic exists for assets within employer-sponsored, definedcontribution plans. 105 While the assets funneled to many mutual funds
ultimately belong to employee-investors, the employer or the plan
administrator actually determines whether the plan will offer a particular
fund. 10 6 Given this reality, funds may have stronger interest in pleasing the
employer or plan administrator than the underlying investors. 107
Competition among financial intermediaries has not yet solved this
problem and seems unlikely to do so. Consider, for example, the proliferation
of funds tracking the S&P 500.108 Many of these funds charge significantly
different fees for tracking the same index, and many investors purchase the
higher-fee funds-a reality that appears inconsistent with a model of the world
that assumes investors are acting in ways that will maximize their returns. 109
This is particularly puzzling because the only real difference between the
funds is the fees.1 10 Higher-fee index funds will always lose to lower-fee index
funds if they track the same index. Even persons we would expect to exhibit

103 Often, commentators describe the market for mutual funds without discussing the
financial advisors' incentives. See Christoffersen et al., supra note 5, at 201 ("The decision
to invest in a mutual fund is usually traced to the investor's preferences and information.").
104
At the least, this market would be informationally and fundamentally efficient-the
price paid for institutional intermediaries would fairly reflect the value delivered.
105
See Tucker, supra note 28, at 121-22.
1061d at 112.
107Id at 123.
108
See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement
Savings and the Limits ofSoft Paternalism,6 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 35, 62-63 (2015)
(discussing the puzzling fee differential between index funds).
109See, e.g., Edwin J. Elton et al., Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index
Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261, 286 (2004) (noting that while minor differences exist, the funds all
advertise that they track the same indexes).
11Id at 261.
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financial sophistication-Wharton MBA students-often make the same
mistake and do not minimize fees. 1 11
The institutional intermediaries offering these higher-fee index funds
know that they are not in the best interests of the persons that purchase them
but they do so anyway because financial advisors will recommend them to
their clients.11 2 For example, purchasing Morgan Stanley's high-fee index
fund instead of a lower-fee index fund simply misallocates capital and diverts
more fees to Morgan Stanley. In this sense, the providers of high-fee index
funds appear to be profiting by presenting opportunities for retail investors to
buy something more aligned with the seller's interest than the investor's. But
the issuers of these high-fee index funds are not the only ones at work heremany of these higher fee index funds charge high fees to kick back a portion
of those fees to the financial advisors that recommend them. 113
Since institutional intermediaries often lack direct relationships with
investors, they compete through financial advisors, and employer-sponsored
retirement plans. 114 Unsurprisingly, to access the pool of retail capital,
institutional intermediaries offer products that compensate financial advisors
for recommending these products to their clients.1 5 While funds adopting
these bias-inducing structures tend to underperform in terms of gains to their
investors, they gain additional net capital inflows-increasing returns to the
asset manager because the asset manager's compensation often derives from
the size of the asset pool managed, not its performance.1 16
Because of the skewed incentives of financial intermediaries, the market
for institutional intermediation is both informationally and fundamentally
inefficient. In informationally efficient markets, it is not possible to lay out "a
trading rule that systematically outperforms the market (net of transaction
costs) absent possession of inside information." 1 1 7 Yet it is possible to lay out
a trading rule to systematically outperform in the market for institutional
intermediation. The rule is straightforward and well-known-buy a broadly
diversified, low-cost index fund.1 18 Put differently, if the market for
111 James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price Fail?An Experiment on Index
Mutual
Funds, 23 REv. FIN. STUD. 1405, 1407, 1429-30 (2010).
112
Russell, supra note 108, at 64-65.
113M. at 57 (explaining that people pick high-fee funds because of an "advice-giver
who114
is financially incentivized through (entirely legal) direct or indirect kickbacks").
See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A
Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of FinancialRisk Taking, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1240 (2011); Tucker, supra note 28, at 121-22.
115 See Christoffersen et al., supra note 5, at 204 ("New investment increases with the
load paid to the broker, in particular when the brokers are unaffiliated .....
116 Id

117See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient CapitalMarkets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 913 (1989).
118See Russell, supra note 108, at 59 n.102 ("[T]here is no debate over indexing
versus active management."); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common
Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational
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institutional intermediation were informationally efficient, it would not be
possible to outperform this market by picking the intermediaries that offer
low-cost passive investing strategies.l19
This inefficiency persists because the market for institutional
intermediation does not function like the stock market. Unlike identifiable
inefficiencies in the stock market, potential arbitrageurs in the institutional
intermediation market do not have access to easy mechanisms to profit off the
inefficiency. In the stock market, one winning strategy would be to identify
reliable losers-stocks that are likely to suffer abnormal negative returns. By
shorting these stocks and betting on their predictable failure, an investor could
book substantial profits. In the market for institutional intermediaries, picking
losers is easy-as a group, the funds that charge high fees for active
management are going to suffer relative underperformance. 120 Yet, investors
cannot usually short mutual funds the same way they would short stocks to
drive the price down. 12 1 When an investor sells a share of a traditional opem
end mutual fund, the mutual fund itself buys the share back-the market price
is set by the net asset value of the fund, not by the market's demand for the
fund. 122
An informationally and fundamentally efficient market for institutional
intermediation would look significantly different than the current overly
dispersed and actively managed landscape. At the least, reducing conflicts of
interest should cause more assets to flow from active to passive
management.1 23 Ideally, this would continue until it would no longer be true,
as a general rule, that passive investing will outperform active investing. This
consolidation process would likely result in passive intermediaries holding
substantially more assets than they do now.
System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007) ("If you are acting with the
most rationality, you will invest in index funds, which hold broad baskets of securities and

bonds reflecting the opportunities and risks faced by the market, recognizing that it is

nearly impossible to pursue an active trading strategy that will beat the market over time.").

119
The market for institutional intermediation is not efficient. See Tucker, supra note
28, at 137 ("Criticisms that the mutual fund market is inefficient point to the wide variety
of fees charged for substantially similar services and information asymmetries among
securities consumers facilitating the persistence of high fees despite the detrimental impact
of returns." (footnote omitted)).
120
See Russell, supra note 108, at 59 n.102 (likening the debate over active versus
passive investing to the debate over climate change because the debate persists even though

the relative underperformance of active management has been conclusively established for
decades).
121 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Protecting Consumer Investors by Facilitating
"Improved Performance" Competition, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 9-16 (discussing barriers
to shorting mutual funds).
122 For a description of the difference between traditional open-end mutual funds and
closed-end mutual funds, see Daniel S. Alterbaum, Control Share Acts, Closed-End Funds,
and the Battle for Corporate Control, 17 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 310, 316-17 (2012).
123
See BURKE & HUNG, supra note 15, at 28 (reporting that after the United Kingdom
banned retail commissions, "flows into index funds increased substantially").
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4. Excessive Speculative Trading
The high volume of speculative trading has long seemed puzzling because
"stock trading is a zero-sum game." 24 While it is possible for an individual to
make trading profits by buying "winning" stocks from others, each transaction
comes at a cost-brokerage commissions and research and analysis costs. 125
Unsurprisingly, the more a person trades, the more money they tend to lose. 12 6
Similarly, actively managed institutional intermediaries tend to
underperform the market. 12 7 This raises the obvious question-why do they
continue actively managing funds? The asset manager's own interests may
best explain the activity. 128 Active trading allows an asset manager to justify
its fees without necessarily delivering value. Of course, because many asset
managers know that they will also be evaluated by their relative performance
against other funds or some market benchmark, many may engage in a
practice known as closet-indexing.1 29 These closeted funds mimic an index by
simply buying largely the same stocks as the index and uselessly trading
within the diversified portfolio.1 30 Closet-indexing protects the asset manager
from exhibiting significant relative underperformance-the closet index will
do about the same as the index, less the fees and expenses collected by the
intermediaries. 13 1 These practices simply extract funds from investors without
delivering any social benefits. In this instance, the deceptive practice-closetindexing-contributes to the excessive volume of trading.

124

See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market

Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REv. 611, 622 (1995) (describing the puzzle

of speculative trading).
12 5 See id
126

See generally Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your
Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance ofIndividual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773
(2000) (showing that returns decline with trading activity).
127 Stout, supra note 124, at 622-64, 664 nn.167-68.
128See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 301 (2012) ("One explanation is that livelihoods depend
on trading."); Tucker, supra note 94, at 182 (explaining that investor time horizons
"conflict with investment horizons of mutual fund managers where the models of
performance evaluation and compensation drive short-term time horizons at the funds").
129See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation ofSecurities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1961, 2018 (2010) (describing closet-indexing).
130Id

131 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What
They Pay For? Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 31, 45-46
(2016) (explaining that closet-indexing allows a risk-adverse manager to avoid
significantly underperforming a benchmark).
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5. Toxic Business Cultures
It is no secret that financial intermediation is known for an abnormally
high frequency of manipulative and deceptive behavior. 132 This may also be
viewed as a problem with corporate culture in the financial services
industry.1 33 To address this problem, policymakers have begun to focus on
altering the corporate and business cultures of intermediaries in the aftermath
of the 2008 financial crisis. 134 For example, FINRA, the self-regulatory
organization for broker-dealer firms, recently declared its intention to
scrutinize culture at financial institutions, going as far as defining culture "as
firm norms-those practices and behaviors within the workplace that have a
'profound influence' on" how institutions manage their business and deal with
conflicts. 13 5
Many cultural problems of financial firms may flow from conflicts of
interest in the compensation structures for financial advisors.1 36 Persons that
13 2

See ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 159 (2012) ("Certain

finance-related fields are among those that often put people in positions offering more than
the usual temptation to be manipulative or less than honest."); see also KAY, supra note 18,
at 246 ("Finance is an especially attractive field for fraudsters .... ).
133 For a definition of corporate culture, see Corporate Culture, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), which says it is "[a] prevalent attitude or atmosphere created
by a company's rules, policies, practices (esp. hiring practices), and communications from
management, such as those touching on compliance or noncompliance with legal
requirements."
134
See Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Regulating Culture:
Improving CorporateGovernance with Anti-Arbitration Provisionsfor Whistleblowers, 58

WM. & MARY L. REv. ONLINE 41, 45-47 (2016), http://wmlawreview.org/sites/default/files
/Packin%20%26%20Edwards-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5G5-WJCY] (discussing efforts
to improve corporate cultures).
13 5

See Megan Leonhardt, FINRA to Scrutinize Firm Culture, WEALTH MGMT.COM

&

(Jan. 8, 2016), http://wealthmanagement.com/regulation-compliance/finra-scrutinize-firmculture [https://perma.cc/VC69-BS6M]. Other regulators adopting a focus on culture
include, William C. Dudley, president and chief executive officer of the New York Federal
Reserve, who called on banks to reform their cultures, adding that regulators might move
to break up banks if behavior patterns did not change. William C. Dudley, President
Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Opening Remarks at Reforming Culture
and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Workshop on Progress and Challenges
(Nov. 5, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2
015/dudl51105 [https://perma.cc/966J-9H75]).Similarly, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's Commissioner Sharon Bowen stated in 2015 that "[w]e have a culture
problem in finance at present," and pushed for reform. Sharon Y. Bowen, Comm'r, U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Keynote Speech Before the Quadrilateral Meeting
at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany (June 24, 2015) (transcript available
at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opabowen-5 [https://perm
a.cc/ZM99-ATBF]).
1 36 See Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 861, 861-62 (2015) ("The trouble, instead, is that the structural conditions of the
financial industry have fostered certain cultural norms."); Donald C. Langevoort,
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do not perform well within this competitive environment will not remain with
financial intermediaries-a market force that drives the development of firm
culture.
Consider, for example, the employment equilibrium within a broker-dealer
firm. The firm hires two different brokers, say Afra and Betsy, with two
different approaches to their clients. Afra takes the strictly ethical approach
and only recommends transactions if she believes them to be in her customer's
best interest. Betsy takes a more flexible approach and simply sells her client
the highest commission product her supervisor deems suitable. 13 7 At the end
of the first quarter, firm managers will compare how much revenue Afra
generated for the firm to the revenue generated by Betsy. After this meeting,
firm managers will likely ask Afra to either produce more or leave the firm. If
Afra leaves the firm, Betsy will take over Afra's accounts. 138

The dynamics giving rise to this equilibrium may explain the amount of
unethical behavior swirling through the financial services industry. Indeed,
one recent survey found that 23% of financial services employees "believe it is
likely that fellow employees have engaged in illegal or unethical activity in
order to gain an advantage over competitors or others at the company." 39
When asked whether "industry professionals have to engage in illegal or
unethical activity in order to be successful," nearly one in five said yes. 140
These survey numbers likely understate the extent of the problem. Few
people would admit to themselves that they exploit their customers. Instead,
they may rationalize their conduct or gradually become desensitized as they

PsychologicalPerspectives on the Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 995, 998 (2011)
("Nor, however, is it likely that this setting favors the naturally honest, candid fiduciary.").
137 0f course, the market imposes some discipline on an overly manipulative retail
intermediary. So long as the retail investor does not attribute underperformance to the retail
intermediary's advice or believe that the retail intermediary has exploited him, the
relationship will likely continue.
138
For a description of this dynamic in practice, see BROWN, supra note 31, at 23,
which states that "[fjor the broker, this equation hits a bit closer to home: 'Doing more
transactions means that I keep my job. It also means that over time I add the assets of other
brokers who are fired for doing too few transactions."' See also Langevoort, supra note
136, at 1001 ("[T]oo great a tendency to adhere to social norms of honesty and respect
interferes with sales production.").
13 9

ANN TENBRUNSEL & JORDAN THOMAS, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, THE STREET, THE
BULL AND THE CRISIS: A SURVEY OF THE US & UK FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 4 (May

2015), www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID-224757
erma.cc/QZ3G-2JJ4].
4
1

0

Id. at 6.

[https://p

2017]

CONFLICTS & CAPITAL ALLOCATION

205

accept the norms of the environment. 141 This environment will tend to contain
persons that are somewhat Machiavellian and "adept at self-deception." 4 2
This dynamic may affect some financial services firms more than others.
Recent studies have found that certain financial services firms hire and employ
financial advisors with abnormally high numbers of customer complaints or
other indicia of possible misconduct. 143 For example, even though only about
7% of financial advisors have indicia of possible misconduct on their records,
about 20% of the financial advisors employed by Oppenheimer & Co., have
disclosures on their records.144 A similar study considered a broader set of data
and found that the financial advisors at six other firms had even higher rates of
misconduct indicia. 145 Firms with particularly high concentrations of brokers
with indicia of possible misconduct on their records may have different firmspecific cultures than other financial services firms and may behave
differently. For example, one recent study found that analysts at firms with
higher numbers of FINRA violations issued less accurate earnings forecasts.1 46
6. Manipulative Sales Practices
Conflicts of interest also drive manipulative sales practices. Recent work
on the economics of manipulation and deception provides a theoretical
framework for thinking about these issues. 14 7 Sensible reforms must address
compensation structures that reward financial advisors for influencing retail
customers to act against their own interests, causing harms within the financial
sector and the real economy. 148 Cass Sunstein recently summarized work on
141 See Langevoort, supra note 114, at 1240 ("Those who get all the way to the top are
often quite gifted at rationalization and dissembling-a high Machiavellian style-carrying
very little of the heavy baggage of moral anxiety."); Langevoort, supra note 136, at 1001
("Firms have a large number of tools at their disposal to make rationalizations easy and
convenient.").

1 42 Langevoort, supra note 136, at 1001.
143 Mark Egan et al., The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct 27 (Mar. 1, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/XC23(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2739170
L8TG].
144Id. at 1.
14 5

Craig McCann et al., How Widespread and Predictable Is Stock Broker
Misconduct? 1, 31 (Apr. 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-276
8942 [https://perma.cc/Q6K8-QALC] ("These six firms - Aegis Capital, Summit
Brokerage Services, National Securities, Centaurus Financial, Independent Financial Group
and Kovack Securities employ a far higher percentage of brokers associated with investor
harm events than other firms.").
146 Joseph Pacelli, Integrity Culture and Analyst Forecast Quality 1 (Kelley Sch. of
Bus., Research Paper No. 15-57, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2641041 [https://perma.cc
/A6KV-WV98].
14 7

See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS:
THE ECONOMICs OF MANIPULATION & DECEPTION (2015).
14 8

Cf id at 24 (citing Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality, and
Seller Reputation, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1982)).
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the economics of manipulation and deception as follows: "companies exploit
human weaknesses not necessarily because they are malicious or venal, but
because the market makes them do it. Those who fail to exploit people will
lose out to those who do." 1 49
The economics of manipulation and deception explain that a free market
also leaves market participants free to exploit the psychological and
informational weaknesses of others.15 0 In any situation where abnormal profits
may be secured by preying on these weaknesses, the default expectation
15
should be that manipulation and deception will occur.s
Businesses that do not take advantage of these opportunities to exploit
human weaknesses may find themselves at a disadvantage or go out of
existence. Consider casinos for example. Slot machines are addictive by
design, but a losing bet for the player.1 52 These machines are major revenue
sources for casinos and are known to cause compulsive addictions in many
people.1 53 If a casino opted against installing the latest machines that most
efficiently and sustainably separate players from their money, it would
gradually lose market share and suffer lower revenues than its competitors
using newer, more addictive models. If the casino were publicly traded, it
might even face takeover bids from outsiders seeking to more profitably
monetize the casino floor for stockholders.
Given this incentive and accompanying pressure, some level of
manipulation and deception should always be expected. Market participants
may use different mechanisms to induce consumers to make unwise decisions.
In the most egregious instances, this takes the form of outright fraud where an
intermediary simply presents "information that is intentionally crafted to
mislead."1 54 Psychological techniques may also be used to induce retail
investors to make decisions more in the interest of a financial advisor than

149

Cass R. Sunstein, Why Free Markets Make Fools of Us, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 22,
2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/10/22/why-free-markets-make-fools-us/
[https://perma.cc/DG87-TBXA] (book review).
1 5 0 See AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 147, at 1.

151d at 170 (challenging the idea that "revealed preferences" should be viewed as the
norm).
152See generally NATASHA

Dow

SCHOLL,

ADDICTION

BY

DESIGN:

MACHINE

GAMBLING
IN LAS VEGAS (2012) (describing slot machines).
153
Id
154
AKERLOF & SHIELER, supra note 147, at xi. The securities laws clearly prohibit
outright, intentional fraudulent statements. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
(1976) (limiting actions under Rule 10b-5 to instances involving fraudulent intent).
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their own. 155 One particularly crude approach involves agitating retail
customers so that their emotions override their common sense. 156
Similarly, the brokerage industry's infamous "Straight Line" sales pitch is
calculated to generate impulsive purchases. 157 When brokers learn the pitch,
they are taught to envision themselves "chasing a prospective customer down
a hallway" filled with doors. 158 Each door represents an excuse that a client
might make to say no to a trade. 159 The pitch arms fmancial advisors with
rebuttals to close the doors through which a client might escape, herding the
client in a straight line toward a sale. 160 For example, if a male client indicates
that he would like to speak with his wife before buying, the financial advisor
will deliver calculated arguments "in the most mocking and emasculating tone
1
that could be employed without going over the line." 61
In the alternative, financial advisors may exploit some social heuristic that
leads retail investors to misperceive reality and place too much trust in a
financial advisor. 162 One common way to induce action from a prospective
client is by exploiting human reciprocity norms. Investors may incur a feeling
of obligation if they accept something from a financial advisor. The
widespread norm of repaying even small favors is a psychological
vulnerability manipulative sales practices exploit because a "small initial favor
can produce a sense of obligation to agree to a substantially larger return

favor."

63

Financial advisors and institutional intermediaries have exploited the
reciprocity dynamic and psychological dynamics with "'free lunch'
seminars." 1 64 Often, these seminars have offered a free meal plus the promise

1 55 See Langevoort, supra note 136, at 997-98 ("The very moment the 'fiduciary'
becomes interested in consumer psychology, he or she starts down a slippery slope, away
from the ethical ideals of candor and respect for the integrity of the client and toward the
objectification of the client as an excitable bundle of wants, hopes, and fears.").
156 In one annuity sales training seminar, participants were told to "[t]oss hand
grenades into the advice to disturb the seniors," and they should "[t]reat them like they're

blind 12-year-olds," and that seniors "buy based upon emotions! Emotions of fear, anger
and greed." Ellen E. Schultz & Jeff D. Opdyke, At Annuity University, Agents Learn How
to Pitch to Seniors, WALL STREET J. (July 2, 2002) (quoting Tyrone Clark, lecturer,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1025561802229705600
University),
Annuity
[https://perma.cc/9EAC-7YWZ].
157
See BROWN, supra note 31, at 174 ("The Straight Line is impulse selling at its most
aggressive .... ).
1 58 Id at 175-76.
1591d at 176.
1 6 0 1d
161 Id at 200.
16 2
AKERLOF & SHIILLER, supra note 147, at xi.
163 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 33 (4th ed. 2001).
164
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N ET AL., PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS: REPORT OF
EXAMINATIONS OF SECURITIES FIRMS PROVIDING "FREE LUNCH" SALES SEMINARS 11 (Sept.
2007), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/freelunchreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q4E-
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of "'free' advice by 'experts."'1 6 5 When the SEC reviewed these seminars, it
found that, while many of them were advertised as "educational," they were all
designed to do one thing-sell products.1 66 in many instances, seminar
attendees were not aware that the seminar itself may have been paid for by an
insurance company or mutual fund under the expectation that the financial
advisor would sell their products. 167 The typical securities law responserequiring more publicly filed disclosure from issuersl 68-seems unlikely to
diminish the efficacy of the reciprocity effect.
Financial intermediaries may also induce unwise decisions by exploiting
"investors' behavioral quirks" and misperceptions about the world. 169
Behavioral economists have identified a series of different cognitive biases
and ways in which people are predictably irrational.17 0 For example, some
investors may simply make a decision about whether to invest by how
confident their financial advisor appears to be.171 This confidence heuristic
may lead them to be too willing to trust overconfident advisors.
A significant level of manipulation and deception may persist because
financial advisors will only rarely face any consequence for recommending
that their retail clients purchase financial products that imperfectly serve their
needs.1 72 For skewed advice to affect a financial advisor's reputation, two
things must occur: (i) the retail client must realize that the financial advisor
made a recommendation that was not in her best interest; and (ii) the retail

VBH5] ("Some ads and mailers used tactics to scare seniors into thinking that they might
not be6 5using the right investment professional, or to question their current investments.").
1

1d at 3.

166Id at I.
167 Id at 4-5.
168 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003) ("Securities
regulation is motivated, in large part, by the assumption that more information is better
than less. Perhaps this is no surprise since the SEC's chief regulatory tool is to require
companies to disclose more.").
169 Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, BehavioralEconomics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 18 (2003).

170 See Alan Schwartz, RegulatingforRationality, 67 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1390 (2015)
(discussing how many different, and possibly offsetting, cognitive biases may be in play
whenever a person makes a decision).
171 Sunita Sah et al., Cheap Talk and Credibility: The Consequences ofConfidence and
&

Accuracy on Advisor Credibility and Persuasiveness, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.

HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 246, 254 (2013) (showing that projecting excessive confidence
can trigger investor reliance).
172
For a discussion illustrating the vital importance of reputation in a different
economic context, see Jamila Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings
Analysis to Reputational Damage Caused by Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REv. 497,
527 (2013).
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client must somehow broadcast that discovery to other retail clients that use
the financial advisor. 173
For retail investors, both mechanisms for reputational consequences to
function appear inhibited. Retail clients may be particularly unlikely to
recognize when they have been bamboozled into buying a high-fee product
because they are often financially illiterate. 174 Even if a retail investor
becomes dissatisfied and brings an arbitration proceeding against a financial
advisor, the financial advisor will often be able to remove the complaint from
public records, further inhibiting the reputation consequence.1 75 One recent
study found that, for cases settled between mid-May 2009 and the end of 2011,
requests to expunge customer complaints from public records were granted
96.9% of the time.1 76 In this market, reputation does not appear to function as
an effective constraint because retail investors do not detect exploitation or
broadcast their findings effectively.
III. ALIGN INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE CAPITAL ALLOCATION

Banning commission compensation for personalized financial advice will
better align financial advisor incentives with their clients' interest and improve
capital allocation.' 7 7 Other nations with well-developed financial sectors,
including Australia and the United Kingdom, have already adopted this
approach, sharply limiting commission compensation in connection with the
provision of personalized investment advice to retail customers. 178 This Part
173

See Judge, supra note 87, at 1550 (describing the two reputation feedback channels
in general terms).
1 74 See Jeffrey T. Dinwoodie, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Financial Illiteracy, the
Mortgage Market Collapse, and the Global Economic Crisis, 18 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV.
181, 181-84 (2010) (documenting widespread financial illiteracy); Tucker, supra note 94,
at 188 (same).
175
See Christine Lazaro, Has Expungement Broken Brokercheck?, 14 J. Bus. & SEC. L.
125, 146-47 (2014) (describing the process through which stockbrokers remove
complaints from their records).
176
See Press Release, Pub. Inv'rs Arbitration Bar Ass'n, PIABA Study: Stockbroker
Arbitration Slates Wiped Clean 9 out of 10 Times When "Expungement" Sought in Settled
Cases (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.piaba.org/system/files/pdfs/PIABA%20Expungement
%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UBB-48G6].
1 77 The problem has been apparent for far too long. In May 1994, the SEC convened a
committee to review "actual and potential conflicts of interest in the retail brokerage
industry." U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON COMPENSATION

PRACTICES 3 (Apr. 1995), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt [https://perma.cc/
WMB3-9VMM]. A majority of that committee declared that because of the conflicts of
interest involved, they "would not design a compensation system based only on
commissions paid for completed transactions." Id. (recommending only partial measures
because commission compensation structures were "too deeply rooted to accommodate
radical alteration in the near-term").
1 78 See Francis J. Facciolo, Symposium Introduction: Revolution in the Regulation of
FinancialAdvice: The US., the UK. and Australia, 87 ST. JoIN'S L. REv. 297,299 (2013)
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presents the proposal to ban commissions and sales incentives in connection
with the provision of personalized investment advice.
A. The Proposal
Congress should replace the current patchwork regulatory structures for
financial advisors and simply ban commission-based compensation for
financial advisors providing personalized financial advice. 179 As explained
above, commission compensation should be banned because it erodes both
investors' savings and macroeconomic stability.
While the proposal would restructure the U.S. financial services model,
other nations have already enacted similar reforms to put market forces to
work for consumers.18 0 When the United Kingdom embraced this approach, it
did so "to establish remuneration arrangements that allow competitive forces
to work in favor of consumers." 18 1 Similarly, Australia banned commissions
because of "mis-selling scandals in which sales targets incentivized financial
advisers to persuade clients to switch out of safe term deposit accounts into
funds that delivered banks increased compensation." 82
Available evidence indicates that banning this most corrosive form of
compensation will improve capital allocation.18 3 After the United Kingdom
banned commission compensation in connection with the provision of
personalized investment advice to retail customers, capital flows shifted with a
substantial increase in funds flowing into index funds. 184

("The United Kingdom and Australia have also been pursuing radical reforms of the
regulation of financial advice given to retail customers. The purpose of these reforms is to
restrict compensation practices for investment advisers that might influence the advice that
they give to retail customers because of their compensation arrangements with financial
product producers."); Gerard McMeel, InternationalIssues in the Regulation of Financial
Advice: A United Kingdom Perspective-The Retail Distribution Review and the Ban on
Commission Payments to FinancialIntermediaries, 87 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 595, 596 (2013)
(explaining that the United Kingdom has outright banned "payments by product providers"
to financial advisors providing investment advice to retail customers); Victoria Stace, New
Zealand's FinancialAdviser Regulation:FallingBehind in the Wake of Overseas Reforms,
26 N.Z.U. L. REv. 869, 870 (2015) ("Both the United Kingdom and Australia have rules
that, broadly speaking, prohibit the receipt of commissions in relation to advice given to
retail clients.").
179 While we did not discuss the impact of conflicted advice on capital allocation,
Christine Lazaro and I previously called for compensation reform. See Lazaro & Edwards,
supra
note 9, at 87-88.
180
BURKE & HUNG, supra note 15, at 9-12.
181Id at 9 (emphasis omitted) (describing reforms in the United Kingdom).
1821d at 12.
183 Id at 31.
1 84 1d The shift should also significantly improve industry culture by freeing financial
advisors from the current forced competition in an environment favoring manipulation and
deception.
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This, of course, will require a move to different forms of payment for
financial advisors. While any payment structure will create some conflict of
interest, alternatives are unlikely to cause the same sorts of harms as
commission-driven financial advice. There are at least three different payment
models that would avoid the capital misallocation caused by commissiondriven advice: (i) fixed, upfront fees; (ii) hourly fees; or (iii) fees calculated as
a percentage of assets under management for ongoing management and
oversight services. 185 None of these compensation structures creates a
financial incentive to recommend one product over another.1 86
Upfront or hourly fees provide the most transparent solutions for retail
investors.18 7 With these compensation structures, the investors are most likely
to understand that they are paying for services. 188 Hourly fees directly tie
compensation received to the amount of work performed.1 89 Retail investors
receiving bills for time spent on their behalf may be more able to effectively
monitor their financial advisors than retail investors paying through
commissions embedded inside complex products.1 90
Fees calculated from a percentage of assets under management do create
conflicts of their own, although not the kind that skew capital allocation. A
financial advisor compensated in this way may simply seek to gather a
sizeable pool of assets to manage without delivering much value. To improve
the ability of investors to monitor the amount of fees collected by financial
advisors under this compensation structure, Congress should require that
financial advisors give their clients an annual statement, clearly showing the
amount of fees collected for advisory services. To ensure that retail investors
understand the structure, financial advisors should be required to secure
consent for this structure on an annual basis.191
While a general ban on commission compensation will do much good, it
may be desirable to allow certain investors to opt in to receiving commissiondriven sales pitches. One possibility may be to only allow accredited and
institutional investors to opt in to receiving commission-driven sales pitches.
Under section 3(a) of the Securities Act, accredited investors include, among
185 Daisy Maxey, How to Pay Your FinancialAdviser, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 12,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0001424052970204554204577024152103830414
[https://perma.cc/W84M-JC6T].
186
To be sure, banning commission compensation would not be a silver bullet solving
all problems. It would simply shift the industry to less troubling forms of compensation. Id.
187 Id.
188 Id
189
Hourly compensation is not without its drawbacks. It creates an incentive to work
inefficiently because spending more time on a project results in increased revenues. See
Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers
and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 1403, 1436 (2016) (discussing concern that hourly
billing leads to an incentive to work inefficiently).
19 0

Maxey, supra note 185.

191 While disclosure will not solve every problem, well-tailored disclosures may
potentiate more effective monitoring.

212

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 78: 1

others, banks, investment companies, and persons with a net worth exceeding
$1 million (excluding the value of a primary residence) or with income
exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent years.1 92 To ensure that the
recipient of a pitch understands that she is receiving a commission-driven sales
pitch, a financial advisor making such a pitch might be required to secure
written client consent before making each pitch.
While commission compensation structures will likely lead to some capital
misallocation, the effect seems unlikely to be as large outside of the retail
market.1 93 Retail investors require special treatment because they are the least
sophisticated and the least able to protect their own interests. 194
Critics may contend that this would cause investors either to pay more for
advice or not receive it at all. Even if these were both true, it might yield better
outcomes. For example, an investor paying 1% of assets under management to
an advisor would likely make better capital allocation decisions-perhaps
buying publicly traded REITs instead of non-traded REITs. While the cost of
the advice might be higher, the gains derived from selecting a superior asset
would outweigh the marginally higher cost and improve economy-wide capital
allocation.
B. Impact on CurrentAdvisors
For the proposal to work, Congress must pass legislation that covers all
persons receiving compensation in exchange for providing personalized
investment advice because such a broad variety of financial advisors now
directly or indirectly sell personalized financial advice to the retail market. 195
Adding to the complexity, policymakers concerned with addressing the
problem face a Gordian knot of overlapping regulatory structures. The person
providing personalized investment advice may be a stockbroker, registered
investment advisor, insurance salesperson, confidence artist, lawyer, some
other financial professional or some combination of the foregoing.1 96 In many
instances, the financial advisor will have no legal obligation to put the

192 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016).
193

See OFFICE OF INV'R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, STUDY
REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS iii (2012) [hereinafter SEC,

FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financialliteracy-study-partl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UXW-P9QX]
(extensively
documenting
widespread financial illiteracy).
194Id at viii.
195
Rules and Resources, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/Pro
fessionalDesignations/RulesandResources/ [https://perma.cc/TY7F-FPEH] ("[B]e aware
that Financial Analyst, Financial Adviser (Advisor), Financial Consultant, Financial
Planner, Investment Consultant or Wealth Manager are generic terms or job titles, and may
be used
by investment professionals who may not hold any specific credential.").
19
6

See id
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investors' interests before her own. 197 While not much research has been done
on the differences in outcomes under different regimes, one recent study found
that the kind of advice investors receive may be partially determined by the
regulatory regime governing its provision. 198
Three significant types of financial advisors now play a major role in
dispensing personalized investment advice and influencing retail capital
allocation decisions: (i) brokers or stockbrokers; (ii) insurance salespeople or
producers; and (iii) registered investment advisers. 199 importantly, many
financial advisors now operate within all three roles at the same time. 200 For
these financial advisors, the proposal will significantly reduce the amount of
regulatory complexity they face. 20 1 While the proposal will significantly affect
stockbrokers and insurance producers, it will not significantly alter the
business model of most registered investment advisers. 202
1. Brokers
Banning commission compensation will have a significant impact on the
business model for many broker-dealer firms. Brokers, the registered
representatives of broker-dealer firms, now provide extensive, personalized
investment advice to retail customers-a shift from their past as providers of
execution services. 203 For the most part, brokers receive transaction-based

197

See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-

Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 59, 77-78

(2010) (discussing different standards); Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 9, at 61-71;
Russell, supra note 108, at 41 ("Individual savers now make those decisions with the
assistance of financial services players who have deeply misaligned incentives").
198 Matthew L. Kozora, The Effect of Regulatory Regimes on the Provision of Retail
Investment Advice 8 (Sept. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-23
23519 [https://perna.cc/FF8G-Y5NA].
1 9 9 COUNCI OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 12, at 6.
200 Id.

201 Cf id. ("[I]ndividual advisers can switch back and forth between ... regimes as
in different activities, a practice known as dual hatting.").
they2 engage
02
See Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 9, at 48 (describing the fragmented market for
personalized investment advice in detail).
203 While brokers once provided execution services, they now describe themselves as
financial advisors. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at i. See generally Laby, supra
note 7 (explaining how changes in the industry made the existing regulatory structure
incoherent). Broker business cards frequently employ titles such as "financial advisor,"
"financial consultant," "financial representative," "investment specialist," "investment
representative," and "registered representative." ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 74 (2008),

https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DUNY3K7].
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commission compensation-if the customer does not buy or sell something,
the broker does not get paid. 204
Differential commissions also bias advice from brokers. Importantly, a
broker may receive more compensation for selling one product over anotherjustifying a concern that brokers give skewed, self-serving advice. 2 05 The
differential commission problem has given rise to the rule of thumb known as
"Brown's law of brokerage product compensation," instructing that "[t]he
higher the commission or selling concession a broker is paid to sell a product,
the worse that product will be for his or her clients." 206
While brokers have an obligation not to commit outright fraud, the law
does not always require them to act in their clients' best interests. 207 FINRA
has rules requiring that brokers and brokerage firms giving personalized
advice "observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade." 20 8 Adding specificity, FINRA also requires brokers to
adhere to FINRA Rule 2111 when giving advice to retail customers. FINRA's
"Suitability" rule provides that:
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a
security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information
obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person
to ascertain the customer's investment profile. A customer's investment
profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer's age, other investments,
financial situation and needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment
experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any
204

See James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-BasedAnalysis of the Legal

Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Frameworkfor Enhanced

Investor Protection, 68 Bus. LAW. 1, 5-6 (2012). The requirement that brokers do
transactions in order to get paid has, of course, created a bias toward action. In the extreme,
this has given rise to a "churning" problem-where brokers cause excessive trading in
client accounts to generate more fees. See Barbara Black & Jill 1. Gross, Making It Up as
They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991,
1010-11 (2002) ("Churning is excessive trading by a broker in a customer's account in
order to generate commissions.").
205
See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 448 (discussing differential commissions).
206
See BROWN, supra note 31, at 217-18.
207 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (prohibiting "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors"). In some instances, brokerage firms may simply conduct a cost-benefit analysis
and decide to simply evade or ignore legal norms, accepting later sanctions as a cost of
doing business. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in
the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 773 (2006) (presenting a
case study focused on conflicts of interest in connection with "misleading reports issued by
securities analysts").
208 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL r. 2010, http://finra.complinet.c

om/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element id=607 [https://perma.cc/VR4E-G5E2].
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other information the customer may disclose to the member or associated
person in connection with such recommendation. 2 09
FINRA's broad "suitability" standard seemingly leaves brokers substantial
leeway to recommend a variety of investments, so long as they are not
manifestly unsuitable-a vague standard in application. 2 10 Notably, FINRA's
"high standard of commercial honor" or suitability rule does not require
brokers to give their clients advice that is in their best interest. 2 11 When a
range of different investments appear "suitable," this standard is frequently
read as allowing brokers to sell their clients the one that pays the broker the
most.2 12 Still, FINRA's suitability rule does place some limits on rapacious
exploitation. Although they do not go so far as to say that brokers must act in
their customers' interests, enforcement decisions and guidance materials have
claimed that suitable recommendations are ones that are "consistent with [a]
customer['s] best interests." 2 13
This leaves substantial room for manipulation. Inducing retail investors to
make decisions that are not in their best interest may be a type of manipulation
and deception that falls short of outright fraud-and a tremendously profitable
business opportunity for more sophisticated parties to profit from the
suboptimal decisions of less sophisticated parties. 2 14
For the most part, the law now regulates brokers as salespeople who owe
limited duties at the time of sale. 2 15 Only in particular circumstances-such as
when the broker assumes discretionary control over the account-will a broker

2091d. r. 2111(a) (A "member" is a broker-dealer and an "associated person" is a
broker).
210 Vague legal standards allow financial entities to argue that they have complied with
their obligations because the exact action required may not be clear. See Di Lorenzo, supra
note 207, at 786 ("Neither the legal mandate nor the required course of action is clear, and,
therefore, denial of noncompliance becomes a prevailing practice.").
211 See BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 4, at 149 ("Brokers ... are subject merely to a
standard under which they may recommend only investments that are 'suitable' for their
clients . . . ."); Christine Lazaro, FiduciaryDuty - Now and in the Future, 17 PIABA B.J.
129, 132 (2010) ("[T]he suitability standard requires that a recommendation merely be
suitable for a customer, not necessarily that it be in the customer's best interest.").
2 12
See Patricia A. McCoy, Degrees of Intermediation,50 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 551,
571 (2015) ("Because the duty of suitability is not a fiduciary duty, securities brokers are
not required to act in their clients' best interests or diversify their portfolios .

..

. Nor must

brokers avoid recommending investments that will maximize their fees if their advice is
suitable otherwise.").
2 13
See Wrona, supra note 204, at 19 & n.137 (emphasis added) (quoting a collection
of sources).
2 14
Cf Lauren E. Willis, Performance-BasedConsumer Law, 82 U. C-u. L. REv. 1309,
1311 (2015) ("In a growing number of consumer transactions today, firms exploit
consumer confusion and promote poor buying choices. The resulting transactions are often
lousy, whether one uses autonomy, welfare, or fairness as the metric.").
215 Wrona, supra note 204, at 93; see also supra text accompanying note 205.
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owe continuing duties to monitor a retail investor's account or provide
ongoing advice in the best interest of the investor. 2 16
The proposal does not impose any ongoing duties on brokers or otherwise
modify their suitability obligation. Rather, it simply removes the incentive to
misallocate retail investor capital to secure commission revenues. This focus
on compensation will not necessarily ensure that brokers give higher-quality
advice. At the least, it will remove the temptation to misallocate capital in
exchange for a commission.
2. Insurance Producers
The proposal will also significantly affect insurance salespersons
providing investment advice. Importantly, securities intermediaries are not the
only financial intermediaries extracting revenue from retail investors.
Insurance salespersons, also known as producers, now market themselves as
financial advisors and pitch increasingly complex products to retail investors
in exchange for commission-based compensation. 2 17
While the suitability standard and other FINRA rules govern the
personalized investment advice retail customers receive from brokers,
insurance salespeople operate within a looser, state-by-state regulatory
framework. 2 18 Now, many states impose a suitability framework modeled on
FINRA's rules for annuity sales. 2 19 Still, commissions-some as high as
12 0/o--may create powerful conflicts of interest for insurance producers to sell
complex deferred annuities to retail investors that do not need them. 220
3. RegisteredInvestment Advisers
Registered Investment Advisers (investment advisers) are a different class
of retail and institutional financial intermediaries and may not be significantly

216 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 823 (2002) (recognizing that the
broker managing a discretionary account owed fiduciary duties); Leib v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("[T]he broker
handling a discretionary account becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense."),
aff'd, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of other circumstances where brokers
may owe ongoing fiduciary duties, see Edwards, supra note 9, at 112-16.
2 17
See Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 9, at 68-71.
218Id

219 Id at 79.
220
Zeke Faux & Margaret Collins, Indexed Annuities Obscure Fees as Sellers Earn
Trip to Disney, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 1-0120/indexed-annuities-obscure-fees-as-sellers-earn-trip-to-disney.html [https://perma.cc/TS6
Y-2X9W] ("Salespeople are paid commissions as high as 12 percent, and some are
rewarded with free trips to Disney World. Unlike the fees on mutual funds, those costs
aren't disclosed.").
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affected by the proposal. 22 1 Investment advisers are directly regulated by the
states and the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers
Act). 2 22 The statute defines investment advisers as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising

others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues
22 3
or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.

Investment advisers differ from brokers and insurance producers in the
duties they owe and the form of compensation they receive. Although the
Advisers Act does not explicitly provide for fiduciary duties, the federal courts
have interpreted it as imposing a fiduciary duty. 224 Yet, what, exactly, does
this duty require? As Justice Frankfurter famously explained, "to say that aman is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?" 225 To
answer this question, the SEC has explained that investment advisers owe
duties of loyalty and care to their clients. 22 6 An investment adviser's duty of
loyalty requires it to "serve the best interests of its clients, which includes an
obligation not to subordinate the clients' interests to its own." 22 7 The Supreme
Court has recognized that in passing the Advisers Act, Congress sought "to
eliminate conflicts of interest between the investment adviser and the clients"

221 Advisers provide a "wide range of advisory services and play an important role in
helping individuals and institutions make significant financial decisions." Amendments to
Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060, 75 Fed. Reg. 49234, 49234 (Aug.
11, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (explaining that investment advisers help
"individuals and families seeking to plan for retirement or save for college to large
institutions managing billions of dollars").
222 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2012). See generally Christine Lazaro, The Future of
FinancialAdvice: Eliminating the False Distinction Between Brokers and Investment

Advisers, 87 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 381 (2013) (describing regulation under the Advisers Act).
223 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). While this broad definition would seemingly include
brokers who also make money by providing personalized investment advice, the statute
specifically exempts brokers from the statute. Id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (stating the definition
does not apply to "any broker or dealer whose performance of such [advisory] services is
solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no
special compensation therefor").
224
See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
191 (1963) (holding that under the Advisers Act, a relationship between an investment
advisor and a client is fiduciary in nature).
225 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
22
6

See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 22.
227Id
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to "safeguard[]" unsophisticated investors. 2 28 Where the conflicts cannot be
eliminated, the Advisers Act requires disclosure. 22 9
To further limit conflicts of interest, the Advisers Act also closely
regulates investment adviser compensation. 230 Investment advisers must
clearly disclose to clients how they receive compensation and only "charge
fees that are fair and reasonable, and when an [investment] adviser's fee is
higher than others, an adviser must disclose this." 23 1 Reducing the incentive to
recommend one product over another or to trade simply to generate
commissions, the overwhelming majority (approximately 95%) of investment
advisers charge clients fees "based on [a] percentage of assets under
management." 232

These limits do not mean that the registered investment adviser model
entirely prevents compensation incentives from skewing the advice
provided. 233 Because most investment advisers receive compensation for
assets under management, they may hesitate to recommend wise actions that
move assets outside of their management-such as paying down a loan or
purchasing a life insurance policy.2 34 Alternatively, they may recommend riskincreasing transactions that increase assets under management-for example,
suggesting that an investor mortgage a paid-off home to put the money in the
market. 2 35
While asset-based fees do come with some conflicts, these conflicts appear
less likely to cause the misallocation of retail investor capital. 236 The proposal
seeks to mitigate these harms by requiring clear annual disclosure of assetbased fees and for retail investors to confirm that they desire to continue
receiving the investment adviser's services on an annual basis.
Moreover, asset-based fees may be particularly inappropriate for passive
buy and hold investors. The SEC has recently begun to focus on a new
problem-reverse churning. 237 This occurs when investment advisers
regularly collect fees for assets under management even when the account

228 CapitalGains, 375 U.S. at 191.
229Id at 191-92 (explaining that the disclosure requirement is intended "to eliminate,
or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviserconsciously or unconsciously-to render advice which was not disinterested").
230

See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 40.
231 Id
232

Id at 7. While most charge based on assets under management, a small number
charge
hourly or fixed rates or receive some commission-based compensation. Id
233
See Edwards, supra note 9, at 110.
234 Id.
2 35
Id
236
While this compensation structure does not entirely eliminate conflicts of interest, it
does remove the incentive to recommend one mutual fund over another. See id
237 Daisy Maxey, SEC Targets 'Reverse Churning'by Advisers, WALL STREET J. (Feb.

24, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304610404579403251590760
602 [https://perma.cc/VM76-A8CU].
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requires little to no management. 238 For example, consider the needs of a
twenty-five-year-old receiving a modest inheritance. If she decides to
passively invest the assets and leave them untouched for the next ten to fifteen
years, she secures substantially lower returns with little benefit by paying an
investment adviser 1.5% per year.

4. The Regulatory ArbitrageProblem
The proposal also solves the arbitrage problem. 23 9 Retail financial
intermediaries may now even engage in a form of regulatory arbitrage to
exploit differences between current regulatory structures to their own
advantage. 240 Regulatory arbitrage occurs when parties shift similar
transactions from one regulatory regime to another to maximize their own
profits. 24 1 For example, some reverse churning may be regulatory arbitragewhen a financial advisor registered as both a broker and an investment adviser
has secured substantial commission-based revenue from a brokerage client,
she may persuade the client to transfer her account to an investment adviser's
assets under management fee structure, allowing the financial advisor to
collect additional compensation from a client account that does not need
assistance. 24 2 Similarly, a broker who is also registered as an insurance
salesperson may decide to sell the client an insurance product to secure a
higher fee than could be secured by a securities product. 243 Regulating

238

See FIDuCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 152 (describing reverse churning).
See, e.g., Lily Batchelder & Jared Bernstein, Is Your FinancialAdviser Making
Money Off Your Bad Investments?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/30/opinion/is-your-financial-adviser-making-money-off-your-bad-investnents.html
[https://perma.cc/44P2-7NZK] (explaining that the SEC "doesn't have authority over all
retirement investments," "[flor example, it can't protect you if your broker recommends
one fixed annuity over a similar but better one because he is receiving a side payment from
the first provider").
240
For definitions of regulatory arbitrage and examples in other contexts, see Victor
Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REv. 227, 230 (2010), which defines
"regulatory arbitrage as the manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a
gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment"; Cathy
239

Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L.

REv. 807, 849 (2015), which explains that corporate inversion transactions are a form of
transnational regulatory arbitrage; and Frank Partnoy, FinancialDerivatives and the Costs
of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997), which states that "[r]egulatory
arbitrage consists of those financial transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or
capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or laws."
241 See BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 4, at 149 (explaining that brokers giving financial
advice may be a form of regulatory arbitrage with brokers marketing themselves as advicegivers without the accompanying burdens of loyalty imposed by the Advisers Act).
242

See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 152.

243 Similarly, registered investment advisers have been known to construct retirement
plans before transitioning to a role as a broker for purchasing the assets for those plans.
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commission compensation across these domains will create a consistent
standard. 244
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS AND ALTERNATIVES

Implementing a blanket prohibition on commission compensation for
retail financial advice will have significant implications for the financial
markets. This Part considers these implications and weighs alternative
proposals, ultimately concluding that a blanket prohibition does the most to get
to the root of the problem.
A. Implications
1. Retail Investors and FinancialAdvisors
Some have argued that altering the current commission-based
compensation system might reduce the public's access to financial advice. 245
That is, those who would have received the attention of a financial advisor
may find themselves making financial decisions without that assistance. 246
This argument assumes that access to a conflicted financial advisor would
be better than a situation where the market did not provide a financial
advisor. 247 Some evidence indicates that many persons would make better
decisions without the self-serving assistance of commission-compensated
financial advisors. 24 8 A study of one state retirement system found that
portfolios of persons that used a broker for assistance were substantially worse

See, e.g., Ron A. Rhoades, FiduciaryDuties: What Policymakers and the Public Need to
Know, BROKE & BROKER BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://www.brokeandbroker.com/index.ph
p?a=blog&id=203 [https://perma.cc/822Z-8S94] ("There is at least one large broker-dealer
/ RIA firm which primarily markets . . . 'financial plans' for its clients. Yet, when it comes
to implementation of the plan, many ... representatives of this firm 'switch hats' to a nonfiduciary role and sell products (which are often proprietary mutual funds).").
244
Anne Tucker has recognized this problem and noted that issues addressed within
agency silos impact behavior before other agencies. See Tucker, supra note 94, at 217
("The issues addressed in each agency's silo-workplace, tax, or securities-have
implications in the other arenas as well.").
245
See, e.g, Batchelder & Bernstein, supra note 239 ("Critics of the proposal argue
that it would hurt the retirement security of low- and middle-income Americans by
reducing access to financial advice, as if more advice equals good advice.").
246 Id.
24 7

Indeed, many retirees would be better off without the assistance they now receive
in free-lunch seminars. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N ET AL., supra note 164, at 11
(discussing free-lunch sales seminars).
24 8
See Russell, supra note 108, at 64 ("Financial advisers, including brokers (who
have no fiduciary duty to their clients), make the problem worse. Most of them are
compensated based on (entirely legal) kickbacks.").
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than portfolios that were constructed without a broker's assistance. 249 Another
recent audit study presented financial advisors, here brokers, with client
portfolios to see what changes they would recommend, if any. 250
Unsurprisingly, the brokers showed a strong bias toward recommending
changes that would move client assets to high-fee mutual funds that would pay
the brokers more money and deliver lower expected returns for their clients. 25 1
Furthermore, small investors will not be without options. The proposal
would likely accelerate the growth of so-called robo-advisers. 2 52 Financial
technology may disrupt much of the traditional investment advice business by
allowing algorithms to select appropriate portfolios for persons that meet
particular characteristics. For example, one leading firm, Wealthfront,
manages over $2 billion in assets and supports accounts as small as $500.253 It
does not even charge an advisory fee on accounts below $10,000.254 For

accounts over $10,000, investors pay 0.25% of the assets under
management. 2 55
On the whole, the proposal will likely reduce the total amount of capital
flowing to financial advisors for their services. While the size of the reduction
cannot be predicted with precision, one recent report conservatively estimated
that the total costs imposed on account of conflicted investment advice now
run to about $17 billion annually. 2 56 Implementing the proposal would result
in investors allocating that $17 billion dollars to other uses. 2 57

249

See generally John Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter, Is Conflicted Investment Advice
Better Than No Advice? (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18158,
2012), http:// www.nber.org/papers/wl 8158 [https://perma.ccIU5D3-EQQ3].
250See generally Sendhil Mullainathan et al., The Market for FinancialAdvice: An
Audit Study (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012), http:/
www.nber.org/papers/wl 7929.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXL8-B9M4].
251 Id
252See Anne Tergesen, Robo Advisers Seen Exploding in Popularity,WALL STREET J.
(Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/robo-advisers-seen-exploding-in-popularity1449860367 [https://perma.cc/Z3AE-JRQ6] (explaining that robo-advice "firms typically
use algorithms to recommend and manage portfolios of low-cost funds for investors,
including implementing tax-saving trades").
253
See Alessandra Malito, Betterment Catches Up to Wealthfront in A UM as Robo
Competition
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Boiling

Point,

INVESTMENTNEWS

(July

30,

2015),

http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150730/FREE/I 50739992/betterment-catches-u
p-to-wealthfront-in-aum-as-robo-competition [https://perma.cc/J8MB-QPZM].
254Fee: How Much Does Wealthfront Charge for Its Service, WEALTHFRONT,

https://support.wealthfront.com/hc/en-us/articles/211003683-Fee-How-much-does-Wealthf
ront-charge-for-its-service- [https://perma.cc/PG76-ZBJZ] (last updated Mar. 24, 2017).
255 Id
256

COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 12, at 2.

257 This could also have other effects, perhaps reducing consumption in the market for
luxury goods. Cf FRED SCIHWED, JR., WHERE ARE THE CUSTOMERS' YACHTS? (John Wiley

& Sons, Inc. 2006) (1940) (pointing out that while certain financial intermediaries had
yachts, their customers did not).
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2. Asset Managers
The proposal also has significant implications for asset managers seeking
to gather capital to manage. At the least, it will mean that funds will no longer
be able to attract retail capital by paying financial intermediaries to
recommend the funds to their retail clients. This may force asset managers to
incur other expenses to advertise their funds to financial advisors. It will also
remove any incentive to pay fees to financial advisors to keep pace with other
funds.
In the alternative, asset managers may move away from the retail market
and focus their offerings on accredited investors. 258 This, of course, does not
mean that retail investors would be prohibited from participating in these
funds, but simply that their decision to invest in these funds would not be
affected by incentive fees paid to their financial advisor.
B. Alternatives
The proposal is not the only means to address the problem. Policymakers
have pursued several different interventions. But, while many of these
alternatives seem likely to yield benefits worth the costs, none seem as
effective as simply banning commission compensation in connection with the
provision of personalized investment advice.
1. FinancialLiteracy Education
One oft-proposed solution to the problem is to give retail investors better
financial education so that they may better protect their interests. 2 59 Because
financial advisors and financial services firms often exploit the sophistication
gap between them and their clients, financial literacy education aims to reduce
the size of the gap by improving retail investors' financial sophistication,
enabling retail investors to protect themselves. 26 0 Yet, overemphasis on
financial literacy education risks victim blaming by portraying the investor as
258 For a discussion of how retail investors are already largely excluded from many
private funds now, see Cary Martin Shelby, PrivilegedAccess to FinancialInnovation, 47

Loy. U. CI. L.J. 315, 367 (2015), who argues that "antiquated regulations have excluded
retail investors from many of the [financial innovation's] benefits."
2591n a sense, this is an agency cost solution, designed to improve the ability of
investors to monitor their financial advisors. Cf Black, supra note 32, at 772 ("The ability
of the retail customer (the principal) to monitor the performance of her registered
representative, to assure that he is making decisions consistent with her investment
objectives, is minimal."); Benjamin P. Edwards, DisaggregatedClasses, 9 VA. L. & Bus.
REv. 305, 320 (2015) (discussing how agency cost analysis has informed securities class
action litigation reforms by seeking to improve monitoring); Tucker, supra note 94, at 224the need for improved investor education).
25 (discussing
260
See Tucker, supra note 94, at 224-25.
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somewhat at fault for being taken in by manipulation and deception. 26 1 It does
not focus on the force driving the manipulation and deception-Ahe incentive
to collect a commission.
Not all problems should be solved by recommending that the victims
better learn to protect themselves. Consider the wisdom of a sheriff warning
travelers that bandits lurk in the forests ahead and offering them free materials
to learn more information about self-defense techniques. This type of
protection from a public regulator seems less effective than having the sheriff
provide a warning while spending more resources to saddle up and clear the
woods. Worse, persons may review a few glossy pamphlets and mistakenly
believe themselves capable. To the extent that regulators allocate funds to
investor education initiatives, they should be effectively designed and based
262
on research showing a likelihood of effectiveness.
Pursuing financial literacy education as a strategy to improve capital
allocation appears to be a game that is not worth the candle: the cost of
effectively educating retail investors to understand modern financial
innovation would outweigh any benefits. 263 To begin, retail investors generally
exhibit low levels of financial literacy. 264 Adding to the difficulty, many
investors make significant decisions when they enter retirement-a period
when many may be experiencing cognitive decline. 265 Given the demands that
most retail investors already face on their time, it seems unlikely that a critical
enough mass would actually take advantage of financial literacy programs,
even if they were available. And, if this confluence of unlikely events were to
occur, financial innovation would likely create new products that had not been
covered by prior education programs.
To a large extent, this approach has already been tried and appears to be a
failure. 2 66 This is not to say that resources should not be devoted to investor
education; rather, financial literacy should not be promoted as a means of
26 1

See Barbara Black, Introduction: Working Toward Fair Treatment for Retail
Investors, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 375, 380 (2008) ("[R]easonable investors are expected to
possess a certain level of understanding and sophistication to withstand broker-dealer
conduct.").
262
See Tucker, supra note 94, at 225 ("[I]nvestor education is not a cost-free
proposition, and resources dedicated to education reform must be allocated to effective
measures based upon current behavioral economic research.").
263
See generally Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-LiteracyEducation, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 197 (2008) (arguing that literacy education's costs outweigh its benefits).
264
Studies show that "investors do not understand the most elementary financial
concepts, such as compound interest and inflation." SEC, FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY,

supra note 193, at vii-viii ("[Miany investors do not understand other key financial
concepts, such as diversification or the differences between stocks and bonds . . . .").
26 5
See Christina M. Costa, Preparingfor the Senior Tsunami: Cognitive Decline in
Aging Lawyers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 471, 473 (2015) ("Normal cognitive aging
occurs when the brain and central nervous system undergo predictable decline over time.").
266
See Willis, supra note 263, at 197 ("[B]elief in the effectiveness of financialliteracy education lacks empirical support.").
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avoiding more difficult regulatory initiatives, allowing policymakers to claim
that they are addressing a problem without directly confronting well-funded
industry lobbyists.

2. Subsidizing FinancialAdvice
Another possible intervention would be for the government to subsidize
unbiased financial advice. Indeed, Robert Shiller has argued that a government
subsidy for "financial and legal advice" could be "justified on the basis of the
externality provided by having a society that functions well." 267 While
providing unbiased, expert assistance to retail investors allocating assets could
certainly improve overall capital allocation, funding such a project would be
quite costly. If the market failed to provide adequate financial advice to
improve capital allocation after prohibiting commission compensation, the
strategy might be worth pursuing because even high costs might be justified to
the extent that it could reduce the likelihood of additional financial crises. 268
This alternative should be considered as a complement to banning commission
compensation.

3. Imposing FiduciaryDuties
One promising additional mechanism to address the problem might be to
require financial advisors to act in the best interests of their clients without
regard to their personal financial interests. This mechanism would likely also
function well with a flat ban on commission compensation. Here, the cost of
additional liability from an enforceable fiduciary obligation to provide advice
in the best interests of customers would more firmly bond financial advisors to
their clients' interests. If an advisor gave self-serving advice, an enforceable
fiduciary obligation would allow the investor to seek damages.
At present, there are two different regulatory levers available to impose
fiduciary duties: (i) the SEC; or (ii) the Department of Labor (DOL). As to the
first, Dodd-Frank authorized the SEC to impose fiduciary duties on a subset of
financial advisors by harmonizing broker obligations with those of registered
investment advisers. 269 For reasons that remain unclear, the SEC has not yet
acted under this authority. One former SEC Chairman has remarked that delay
267

SHILLER, supranote 132, at 84.
2681d. at 85 ("Avoidance of a financial crisis such as the one which we now find
ourselves offers a perfect example of the kind of externality that justifies government
subsidy of financial, as well as legal, advice for everyone.").
2691For a discussion of this possibility and the extent to which brokers are already
subject to fiduciary duties, see Edwards, supra note 9, at 112-18, and FIDUCIARY STUDY,
supra note 7, at vi, which recommends that the SEC use its authority under Dodd-Frank to
make a rule to require brokers to "act in the best interest of the customer without regard to
the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the
advice."
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appears to be driven by philosophical divisions that will cause SEC
Commissioners to remain "locked in conflict on this issue for a long, long
time." 270
While the SEC has the power to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers and
registered investment advisers, its power is still limited. While Dodd-Frank
authorized the imposition of a fiduciary duty, it also included a provision
stating that the "receipt of compensation based on commission or fees shall
not, in and of itself, be considered a violation of such standard applied to a
broker, dealer, or investment adviser," seemingly limiting the SEC's ability to
target commission compensation directly. 27 1 Moreover, even if the SEC were
to act to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers and registered investment
advisers, that duty would not stretch to reach insurance producers-persons
now providing the same sorts of services as brokers and investment
advisers. 272
In the absence of action from the SEC and over extensive industry
opposition, 273 the DOL has proposed to use its authority under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act to impose a fiduciary duty on all persons
providing advice in connection with retirement accounts. 2 74 While the new
DOL rule has not yet been fully implemented, if it survives, it seems likely to
affect nearly all capital-allocation decisions involving retirement accounts,
including instances where retail investors receive advice from insurance
producers. 27 5 From a capital-allocation perspective, imposing a fiduciary duty
2 70

See INST. FOR THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD, INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT 74TH
ANNIVERSARY - STATEMENTS FROM INDUSTRY LEADERS AND EXPERTS (Sept. 2015),

-

http://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Arthur Levitt andDavi
d_Tittsworthon_IAA_at 75.pdf [https://perma.cc/U33Y-2HR4] (statement of Arthur
Levitt, former Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
271 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111
203, sec. 913(g)(2), § 211, 124 Stat. 1376, 1828-29 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80bI I(g)(1) (2012)).
2 72
See Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 9, at 74-84 (describing limits on the SEC's
ability to regulate insurance producers selling equity-indexed annuities).
2 73
See Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform & Elizabeth Warren, Ranking
Member, U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Econ. Policy, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs, to Thomas Perez, Sec'y, Dep't of Labor & Shaun Donovan, Dir., Office of Mgmt.
& Budget (Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from Cummings & Warren],
http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-2-1 lLettertoDOL and OMB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UYG5-Q2HX] (describing intense industry opposition to the Department
of Labor's proposed fiduciary rule).
2 74
See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946 (Apr. 10, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509,
2510, 2550).
275 in a changing political climate, some observers believe that Congress may move to
block the DOL's fiduciary rule. Michael Wursthorn & Lisa Beilfuss, Donald Trump
Victory Casts Clouds Over Fiduciary Rule, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 11, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-victory-casts-clouds-over-fiduciary-rule-14787
09489 [https://perma.cc/U3LD-KLAV].
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on advisors may offer significant benefits for the economy by reducing the
likelihood that advisors will misallocate client assets in exchange for
commissions.
While a fiduciary rule promulgated by the DOL might provide significant
benefits, this Article's proposal seeks an even broader reform-one that would
affect all retail investor assets, not merely assets held within the retirement
accounts that give rise to the DOL's jurisdiction. While the DOL's approach
will likely do much good, broader benefits could be achieved by creating a
consistent standard for retirement and non-retirement funds. This is not to say
that the DOL's proposal does not deserve enthusiastic support simply because
it would be better to have Congress enact more far-reaching legislation.
The vociferous opposition raised by certain issuers of high-commission
products provides evidence that the DOL's fiduciary rule may significantly
affect the allocation of retirement account capital. 276 Put simply, certain
issuers will likely see their capital inflows reduced in a fiduciary
environment-forcing them to develop some other strategy to attract capitalperhaps by improving their returns. 277 Consider, for example, the objections
raised by non-traded REITs, a sector that has generally fought against the
implementation of a fiduciary standard.2 78 Spokespersons for the interests of
non-traded REITs have argued that under an early iteration of the DOL
fiduciary rule, investors could lose their ability to diversify by adding nontraded REITs to their investment portfolios, an unpersuasive argument because
retail investors could achieve real estate exposure by buying a publicly traded
REIT. 279
V. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that the economic interests of financial advisors play a
significant role in shaping capital allocation decisions, and that the
misalignment of those incentives and the interests of retail investors generates
cascading harms for ordinary investors and the capital markets. The current
commission compensation structure for many financial advisors means that
corrosive conflicts of interest undermine efficient capital allocation. This
Article aims to improve capital allocation, by focusing regulatory attention on
the source of much capital misallocation-commission compensation
structures that encourage financial advisors to induce investors to make unwise
decisions.
276
See
27 7

Letter from Cummings & Warren, supra note 273, at 2.
Id. at 4.

278 Along with letters submitted by many others, the Public Non-Listed REIT Council
of the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (the "Non-Listed REIT
Council") submitted an eight-page letter seeking changes to the DOL's proposed fiduciary
rule for retirement accounts. See Letter from Exec. Comm., NAREIT PNLR Council, to the
Office of Regulations & Interpretations, U.S. Dep't of Labor (July 21, 2015),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-andregulations/public-comments/1210-ZA25/00245.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT3C-YKA3].
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